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Recently, Scherer and Lambert (2009) proposed a new model of priming, which 
they called the Response Mapping (RM) Model.  That model assumes that under 
some circumstances, priming effects are the result of an unintentional tendency 
for participants to impose the target categorization task onto the primes (which 
they are supposed to ignore). In the present dissertation, the RM model is 
reviewed, and the implications and boundary conditions of the model are 
explored.  In Experiments 1 and 2, it was predicted and found that response 
mapping processes can result in evaluative conditioning effects.  That is, priming 
tasks do not always simply measure attitudes, but rather these tasks can 
additionally create new attitudes towards the prime stimuli.  In Experiments 3 and 
4, two boundary conditions of the RM model were tested.  In those experiments, it 
was found that evaluative priming effects  depend on participants’ ability to 
perceive the primes as belonging to distinct categories (boundary condition 1), 
 iii 
 
and that  those distinct categories must have different evaluative connotations 
(boundary condition 2).  Importantly, results showed that priming effects are 
significantly stronger when primes are easily categorizable, relative to when they 
are not, even when the evaluative strength of the primes is held constant.  
Implications for theory and research involving priming measures and implicit 
attitudes more generally are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Attitudes and attitude formation have long been a central focus of research 
in social psychology (Fazio & Petty, 2008).  For the majority of social 
psychology’s history, attitudes have been explored primarily by using direct 
inquiries into peoples’ evaluative judgments.  For example, participants are 
typically asked questions such as “How do you feel toward the Group X”, and 
their answers are recorded on a Likert scale.  However, this approach has quite a 
few obvious flaws, arguably the most important of which is that direct self-report 
measures are subject to social desirability pressures (Crowe & Marlowe, 1960; 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995).  That is, a participant might be less 
willing to provide an accurate report of his or her attitudes if the truthful answer is 
a socially unacceptable one.  Hence, one longstanding priority in the social 
psychological field is to develop measures that sidestep this social desirability 
concern and tap into attitudes that participants might not ordinarily be willing or 
able to articulate explicitly (Devine, 1989; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 
1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGee & Schwartz, 
1998; Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Payne, 2001; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 
2005; Scherer & Lambert, 2009).    
This longstanding desire to tap into people’s true feelings (as opposed to 
their socially desirable feelings) can explain, in part, why the past twenty years of 
attitude research has been flooded with a wave of interest in indirect tests of 
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attitudes, also known as “implicit attitudes” (Bargh, 1999; De Houwer, 2006; 
Fazio et al. 1995; Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Gawronski, LeBel & Peters, 2007; 
Greenwald et al., 1998; Hassin, Uleman & Bargh, 2005; Olsen & Fazio, 2003; 
Payne, 2001).  Although there is currently some lively debate as to the exact 
meaning of the term “implicit” (De Houwer, 2006), for the purposes of this article 
the main differences between explicit and implicit measures is that the latter (a) 
do not involve direct queries about the attitude object; (b) offer much less 
opportunity for people to exercise control over their responses and (c) are 
typically more sensitive in detecting the presence of, as well as changes in, 
evaluative associations with the attitude object.   
To date, many psychological tests have been developed for the purpose of 
assessing attitudes indirectly.  Perhaps the most popular and widely-used of these 
tests belong to a broad category of tasks, known collectively as priming tasks (e.g. 
Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Fazio et al. 1986; Fazio et al. 1995; Payne 2001; 
Payne et al. 2005; for an excellent review and analysis of these tasks see Klauer & 
Musch, 2003).  In a typical priming task, participants are asked to view images 
that appear in rapid succession on a computer screen.  For example, in Payne’s 
(2001) priming paradigm, participants are presented with a picture of either a 
Black or White face (the prime), and after a few hundred milliseconds this face is 
replaced by a picture of either a gun or a tool (the target).  Participants are 
instructed to ignore the face, and respond only to the target by indicating (with a 
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key press) whether that target is a tool or a gun.  In this task (as well as in other 
similar priming tasks), participants are not able to ignore the primes, and in fact, 
the primes actually end up systematically biasing participants’ responses to the 
targets.  For example, the presence of a Black prime makes it more likely that the 
target will be identified as a gun, even if it is actually a tool.  The White prime 
produces exactly the opposite effect, insofar as participants are more likely to 
identify the target as a tool if it is preceded by a White face, even if the target is 
actually a gun.  This biased pattern of responding is assumed to reveal 
participants’ underlying stereotypic associations with Black and White faces.  The 
upshot of these considerations is that priming tasks, such as the one just 
described, can potentially tap into participants’ “real” evaluations of the primes, 
without having to directly ask participants to report their attitudes.  For the 
reasons discussed above, these sorts of tasks represent a potentially huge 
advancement in attitude measurement and theory. 
In spite of their potential utility, implicit measures have been the target of 
much controversy (e.g. Cunningham, Preacher & Banaji, 2001; De Houwer, 2006; 
Olsen & Fazio, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2007).  Concerns have been raised about 
the reliability and predictive validity of these measures, as well as how these 
measures are related (or not) to explicit reports (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Lambert, Payne, Ramsey 
& Shaffer, 2005; Olsen & Fazio, 2003; Olsen & Fazio 2004; Payne, Burkley & 
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Stokes, 2008; Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 
1997; Wittenbrink & Schwarz; 2007).  Moreover, there have been perhaps a 
dozen review articles in the past ten years devoted to trying to articulate exactly 
what an “implicit attitude” is, and what it means to have such an attitude (e.g. De 
Houwer, 2006; Gawronski et al. 2007).  Implicit attitudes have been variably 
understood as unconscious, uncontrollable, unintentional, or some combination of 
these factors (Bargh, 1994).  To date, there is still much controversy concerning 
what these tasks are measuring, and how these tasks produce their effects.   
The Present Research 
Although implicit attitude measurement represents a significant theoretical 
advance in the field of social psychology, clearly more work is needed to help 
clarify exactly what these tasks are measuring.  In the present article, I will 
attempt to shed some light on this issue, by examining a new model of priming, 
called the Response Mapping Model.  The basic features of this model, along with 
five studies offering support for its assumptions, were recently reported by 
Scherer and Lambert (2009).  However, as will become clearer in the sections to 
follow, some fundamental questions remain about this model, including some 
ambiguities as to the exact nature of the processes involved.  Hence, the 
overriding goal of my dissertation is to further explore the response mapping 
framework above and beyond any of the research that has been done thus far.  In 
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the present research, I will systematically examine both the boundary conditions 
and implications of the response mapping model. 
Brief Introduction to the Response Mapping Model 
 As I will explain in greater detail in a subsequent section, response 
mapping presents a new way of thinking about and understanding both priming 
tasks and automatic behavior in general.  The response mapping model begins 
with the assumption that people use salient goals and motives as a cue for 
categorizing the stimuli in their environment (for a detailed discussion of goal-
related categorization, see Barsalou, 1991).  Hence, automatic behaviors toward 
any given object are context-dependent; that is, they depend on the particular 
response tendency that is salient at the time of judgment, as well as the particular 
array of stimuli that are being judged.   
To illustrate some of the basic elements of response mapping, it is useful 
to imagine a starving person who must decide what objects in his environment are 
a potential source of nourishment, and what are not.  Since this person is starving, 
he will have a goal to eat.  This goal will cause him to categorize things in his 
environment as either edible or inedible, and this categorization process is 
associated with a relevant response, namely, to eat or not to eat (Barsalou, 1991).   
However, the starving person’s categorization of an object as either edible 
or inedible, and his subsequent response to that object, will depend on the array of 
things that are available in his environment.  For example, a person faced with a 
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choice between an insect and a rock will probably attempt to eat the insect.  
However, that same person, when given a choice between the insect and an 
unfamiliar fruit, may view the insect as inedible.  Note that the starving person 
may not actually think that an insect is a particularly good example of food, no 
matter what the circumstances, but his behavior toward that insect will 
nonetheless reflect the fact that he has categorized it as either “something to eat” 
or “something that I probably shouldn’t eat”.  Also note that if this person was not 
starving, then there would probably be no attempt to classify any of these objects 
as food.  In fact, from the perspective of a well-fed person, all of these objects 
(the rock, insect and strange fruit) might be viewed as inedible.  The upshot of 
these considerations is that when faced with a strong motivation to categorize 
objects along a given dimension (i.e. food or non-food),  people will attempt to fit 
their environment into those dimensions, even if this leads to unlikely or unusual 
categorization judgments (Barsalou, 1983; Barsalou, 1991).  In sum, a person’s 
response to any given object is guided by an interaction between a) the goal that is 
activated at the time of judgment, and b) the context in which that object is 
judged.  These are the two basic tenets of response mapping.   
Overview of the Present Dissertation 
In the following pages, I will argue that both explicit and implicit 
judgments are guided by the aforementioned principles of response mapping.  
Although this paper will focus on models of priming, the overall goal is to 
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demonstrate a novel account of automatic human behavior.  In Part I of the 
following introduction, I will review two dominant models that have been used to 
explain priming effects, namely spreading activation and response compatibility.  
In Part II, I will describe the Response Mapping (RM) Model of priming, which 
was recently proposed by Scherer and Lambert (2009).  In Part III, I will briefly 
describe a few experiments that support the RM model.  In Part IV, I will discuss 
some important implications of the RM model, and how these implications 
provide the impetus for the present research.  Finally, in Part V, I will present four 
experiments that constitute the present research.  These experiments lend crucial 
insights into the RM model.  Hence, the overall purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore the various implications of the response mapping framework, in order to 
gain a greater understanding of priming tasks and automatic processes that 
underlie them. 
PART I:   
Spreading Activation and Response Compatibility in Evaluative Priming 
 On the surface, priming effects seem to result from a fairly simple set of 
processes:  The prime activates an attitude, and that attitude influences 
participants’ subsequent response to the target.  However, such a simplistic 
explanation leaves many questions unanswered, the most important of which is 
how primes exert their influence over participants’ responses.  In the following 
pages, two dominant models are considered: spreading activation and response 
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compatibility.  It is worth noting that both of these models have ardent supporters, 
and no research has been successful in developing a critical test of the viability of 
the two models (Klauer & Musch, 2003). 
 Spreading Activation Models of Priming 
According to the spreading activation model of priming, memories are 
organized as a web of associated nodes.  Each node represents a concept, such as 
“robin,” “sparrow” or “dog”, and the nodes are organized so that related concepts 
are located closer together on the web than unrelated concepts (Anderson & 
Pirolli, 1984; Balota & Lorch, 1986; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1991; Neely, 
1977; for a more recent review of related models, see Ratcliff et al. 2004).  For 
example, the concepts “robin” and “sparrow” are closer together in this 
conceptual network than “robin” and “chair”.  When a particular node is 
activated, it pre-activates closely related nodes.  Therefore, uttering the word 
“robin” will pre-activate all sorts of related concepts, such as “sparrow,” “bird” 
and “fly”, and as a result, these secondary concepts will come to mind more easily 
than would other, unrelated concepts. 
Spreading activation models were originally designed to explain findings 
from lexical decisions tasks (LDTs).  A LDT is similar to the priming tasks 
described earlier, except that both the primes and targets are typically words, and 
participants are instructed to ignore the primes and identify targets as either real 
words or non-word letter strings (e.g. “kumph,” “lapgh”).  Moreover, the primes 
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and targets are paired so that they are either semantically related to each other 
(e.g. robin-bird) or unrelated (e.g. robin-chair).  Typically, researchers find that 
responses are facilitated when the prime and target are related, relative to when 
they are not (Neely, 1991).   
The spreading activation model explains LDT effects by assuming that the 
prime pre-activates related target words, making these related targets easier to 
identify than unrelated targets (c.f. Neely, 1991; for a more recent and 
sophisticated model, see Ratcliff et al. 2005).  For example, when participants are 
primed with the word “bird”, this pre-activates all of the concepts that are closely 
associated with birds in memory.  If the following target word is one of these 
related concepts, like “robin”, then the target will be easy to identify as a word 
because it is already partially activated.  If the following target word is an 
unrelated concept (like “chair”), however, then participants will have to do a more 
detailed memory search for this item before it can be identified as a word.  The 
result is that related target words are identified more quickly than unrelated target 
words. 
A Spreading Activation View of Evaluative Priming   
Spreading activation models were designed to account for semantic 
priming effects (that is, priming from “sparrow” to “robin”).  According to some 
researchers, spreading activation can explain evaluative priming effects as well 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & 
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Williams, 1995; Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989; Bower & Cohen, 1982).  
According to Fazio’s attitude accessibility hypothesis,  
“Presentation of an attitude object would automatically activate any strong 
association to that object.  Such activation is assumed to spread along the paths 
of the memory network, including any evaluative associations.  Consequently, 
the activation levels of associated evaluations are temporarily increased.  If a 
target word that corresponds in valence to one of these previously activated 
evaluations is subsequently presented for judgment, then less additional 
activation is required…for a judgment to be made” (Fazio et al., 1986, p. 231).   
On the surface, it might seem perfectly fitting to extend spreading 
activation from semantic priming to evaluative priming.  Yet a spreading 
activation view of evaluative priming actually requires a significant extension of 
the original model.  According to the original spreading activation model, primes 
activate a conceptual node, which pre-activates other related concepts.  But 
according to a spreading activation model of evaluative priming, primes activate a 
global evaluative node, which pre-activates all other concepts that share a similar 
evaluative connotation (Bower, 1981; Bower 1987; Bower 1991; Fazio et al. 
1986).  For example, a cockroach is thought to activate a “negative node”, which 
in turn pre-activates a broad array of other negative concepts.  These pre-activated 
negative concepts need not be conceptually related to cockroaches.  That is, a 
picture of a cockroach could pre-activate such broad-ranging concepts as “pain,” 
“shame” and “death”.  According to the spreading activation account of 
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evaluative priming, all of these words should receive equal activation as a result 
of viewing the cockroach picture, even though cockroaches usually don’t cause 
shame or pain.  This is an important extension of semantic priming, because it 
proposes that there is a generalized evaluative node that exists in addition to 
specific semantic nodes, and this evaluative node can produce priming in the 
absence of semantic relatedness.  In fact, some researchers have proposed that the 
concept of a generalized evaluative node extends the spreading activation model 
too far (for a detailed discussion of this issue, see Klauer & Musch, 2003).  As a 
result, an alternative response compatibility model has been proposed as another 
way of accounting for evaluative priming effects. 
Response Compatibility Models of Priming 
Response compatibility models were originally developed to explain 
effects from the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991).  In the Stroop task, 
participants are presented with color words (e.g. “blue”, “yellow”) that are written 
in various colors of ink.  Participants’ task is to identify the color of the ink, while 
ignoring the written word.  When the word and ink colors are the same, this task 
is fairly easy.  However, the task becomes quite difficult when the word and ink 
colors are different.  For example, participants are much slower to correctly 
respond to the word “blue” written in red ink than the word “blue” written in blue 
ink. 
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These effects are thought to occur as a result of interference between the 
response activated by the irrelevant stimulus (in this case, the word), and the 
response activated by the relevant stimulus (in this case, the ink color).  When the 
two respective responses are compatible, then responding is facilitated.  When 
they are incompatible, responding is inhibited.  Importantly, the response 
compatibility model assumes that the conflict or compatibility between the 
responses is the driving force behind priming effects (Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel 
& Peters, 2008; for a review, see Musch & Klauer, 2003; also see Flanker effects, 
Erikson & Erikson 1974).  If the responses activated by the irrelevant and relevant 
stimuli do not produce any interference (for example, if the word “truck” is 
written in blue) then no priming effects should emerge. 
A Response Compatibility View of Evaluative Priming 
 Extending the above logic to evaluative priming is relatively 
straightforward.  In an evaluative priming task, the irrelevant stimulus is the 
prime, and the relevant stimulus is the target word.  Participants’ task is to 
identify the target words as either good or bad, and hence, these targets obviously 
activate either a good or bad response.  However, even though participants are 
told to ignore the primes, they cannot, and the primes similarly end up activating 
either a good or bad response (Gawronski et al., 2008; see also Klauer & Musch, 
2003).  For example, a cockroach prime will activate the “bad” response, and if 
the following target word requires the “bad” response, then the correct response 
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will be facilitated.  If the following target word requires a “good” response, 
however, then the correct response will be inhibited.  In this way, the “activation 
of the attitude associated with the [prime] suggests a response that either 
facilitates or inhibits the response to the following target word” (Ferguson & 
Bargh, 2003, p. 173).   
 One important prediction that is borne out of response compatibility 
models is that the nature of the priming effect should depend on the nature of the 
response that is required by the task.  That is, response compatibility predicts that 
priming effects should be task dependent, and to some extent this has been found 
to be the case (De Houwer et al. 2000; Klauer & Musch, 2005; Klinger et al., 
2000; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998).  For example, priming effects that are 
evaluative in nature should occur only when the responses required are also 
evaluative (e.g. negative and positive word judgments).  To illustrate, suppose 
that on a given trial, the prime is a cockroach and the word is “horrible”.  If the 
task is to identify this word as negative or positive, then the negative response is 
activated by both the prime and target, causing facilitation.  On the other hand, if 
the task is to identify the targets as either nouns or adjectives, then the cockroach 
should activate the “noun” response whereas the target word (horrible) should 
activate the “adjective” response.  In this instance, therefore, the cockroach should 
not facilitate responses to the word “horrible”; in fact, the cockroach should 
inhibit responding to it, because the prime is a noun whereas the target is an 
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adjective.  These sorts of predictions have been verified empirically (Holender, 
1992; Klauer & Musch, 2003).  While spreading activation models can also 
account for such findings, it requires taking on a number of somewhat awkward 
additional assumptions.1  Hence, these sorts of findings are considered good 
evidence for the response compatibility view. 
PART II:   
The Response Mapping Model 
The RM model represents an entirely new model of priming that is distinct 
from both the spreading activation and response compatibility views.  Although 
the RM model assumes that primes activate responses, the RM model goes 
considerably beyond response compatibility to argue that primes can sometimes 
activate responses for reasons apart from their semantic or evaluative meaning.  
That is, there might be some situations in which an ordinary household object 
could activate a positive response, or a negative response, even though that object 
has no positive or negative connotations whatsoever.  Essentially, the RM model 
postulates a mechanism by which primes can activate responses that have no a 
priori relation to the primes themselves (I will explain this mechanism in full 
detail, below).  For example, according to this model, a picture of a towel can, 
under the right circumstances, activate a “flower” response or a “food” response, 
even though towels have no characteristics of either flowers or food.  To my 
knowledge, no other model of priming makes this claim.   
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Response Mapping in Explicit Judgments 
Response mapping can occur in both explicit and implicit judgmental 
domains.  For ease of exposition, I will first explain response mapping in explicit 
judgments.  Then I will explain how this same concept can be applied to priming 
tasks. 
Suppose for a moment that participants are asked to explicitly judge the 
size of a mouse using only one of two response options: “small” and “large”.  
Further suppose that participants have already used the “small” response to refer 
to an extremely small target, such as a single celled organism.  Under normal 
circumstances, participants would probably refer to mice as small, but use of that 
response option in this particular rating context violates participants’ motivation 
to successfully convey that they recognize that mice are bigger than amoebas.  
Hence, the mouse is assigned the “large” rating by default, because the other 
response option—“small”—has already been reserved for the other stimuli being 
considered in that task.  When pressed on the matter, we suspect that most 
respondents would admit that they don’t really think that mice are “large” (but see 
Kosslyn, 1975).  After all, this is not the type of language people usually use in 
connection with these animals.  However, respondents might respond (with 
perhaps some indignation) that they were essentially doing the best they could 
with the response options that were provided for them by the experimenter.   
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This deliberately simple example illustrates what turns out to be fairly 
complex set of issues, which have been explored in a number of different 
judgmental models, most notably range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965).  One 
of the features of this model is that it assumes that overt ratings can reflect a 
compromise between a frequency principle (a bias towards using the available 
response alternatives equally often) and a range principle (a motivation to 
accurately match the range of responses to the range of underlying stimuli).  (See 
Wedell et al. 2007 for a related discussion).  Range-frequency theory represents a 
powerful, but rather complex, model that is capable of addressing judgmental 
settings far more complex than the simple example used here and full appreciation 
of it requires understanding of some rather complex mathematical modeling 
assumptions.  
Nevertheless, for the present purposes, the critical assumption of this and 
other “response-based” models of judgmental contrast (Biernat, 2005) is that 
human judgment often involves a basic process of response mapping.  In this case 
“response mapping” is defined as the process by which people select a particular 
response (e.g. “good”, “2”, “pretty”) and use it to refer to a given stimulus.  As 
part of this process, the mapping of response options onto extreme stimuli can 
displace ratings of less extreme stimuli onto other sorts of responses, and this 
displacement essentially describes a contrast effect.  In other words, mice can be 
large, and elephants can be small, provided that the category labels that are 
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normally used to refer to these stimuli have already been assigned to some other, 
even more extreme stimuli in that particular setting.   
Response Mapping in Evaluative Priming Paradigms 
The basic principles described above can, in principle, be applied to 
implicit judgment domains, including priming paradigms. Just as in the case of 
explicit judgments, priming paradigms can involve mapping of response options 
onto primes.  Note, however, that there are a few important differences that 
characterize response mapping here as it might occur in priming paradigms.   
In explicit rating paradigms, response mapping arises as part of 
participants’ intentional goal, which is to respond to and rate the target stimuli.  
The situation in priming paradigms is somewhat more complex.  Participants’ 
responses to the targets are part of their primary, intentional goal (e.g. to classify 
words as positive and negative).  However, participants are also responding to the 
primes, even though they are not supposed to be attending to these stimuli at all. 
This creates an interesting state of affairs in evaluative priming paradigms: While 
participants intentionally sort the targets into “good” and “bad” categories they 
are, at the same time, unintentionally sorting the primes into “good” and “bad” 
categories as well.  That is, the response mapping framework proposes that 
participants unintentionally impose the response categorization scheme onto the 
primes.  The primes become associated, or “mapped”, with the responses as a 
result of this process (see Figure 1 for a graphic depiction of this process).   
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 Under normal priming circumstances, the response mapping assumption is 
not particularly noteworthy, in the sense that researchers almost always present an 
exactly balanced ratio of positive and negative primes.  In fact, we are aware of 
very few studies in the social psychological literature that do not follow this 
general rule.  In other words, if participants end up mapping the positive primes 
with positive responses, and the negative primes with negative responses, this 
could be seen merely as a validation of the initial assumptions of the 
experimenter.  For example, Figure 1a displays two types of primes that might be 
presented in a priming task.  The picture of a shark activates a negative 
evaluation, and thereby elicits a negative response.  Likewise, the picture of a 
butterfly activates a positive evaluation, and thereby elicits a positive response. 
However, note what might happen when participants are presented with an 
array of priming stimuli consisting of extreme stimuli (e.g. unambiguously 
negative primes) along with an array of relatively neutral stimuli (Figure 1b).  In 
Figure 1b, half of the primes are unambiguously negative, and half are neutral.  
According to the response mapping framework, participants will attempt to 
impose the good/bad classification scheme onto all of the primes, even though 
half of the primes are actually neutral.  The neutral primes do not activate any 
particular evaluation, and therefore do not fit either the “good” or “bad” response 
labels perfectly.  Nevertheless, there is a clear evaluative distinction between the 
neutral primes and the other unambiguously negative primes that are presented in 
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the task.  As shown in Figure 1b, the result is that the neutral primes will activate 
the “positive” response, even though those primes are not particularly positive.  
Just as a mouse may be mapped onto the “large” response in order to distinguish 
it from amoebas, a neutral prime may be mapped onto the “positive” response to 
distinguish it from extremely negative primes.   
Hence, when the neutral primes are embedded among the negative primes, 
the unfavorable response option (“bad”) is mapped onto the negative primes, 
leaving the remaining (“good”) response option for the neutral stimuli.  
Conversely, when the neutral primes are presented along with the positive primes, 
the favorable response option (“good”) is mapped onto the positive primes, 
leaving the remaining (“bad”) response option for the neutral stimuli, by default 
(see Figure 1c).  Consequently, the response mapping framework predicts that 
strong contrast effects will emerge for neutral primes when they are placed in a 
task along with either extremely positive or extremely negative primes.   
These are precisely the sort of effects that Scherer and Lambert (2009) 
found in their research.  In their experiments, Scherer and Lambert presented 
participants with evaluatively neutral prime pictures, and varied the context in 
which those neutral primes were presented.  For half the participants, the 
evaluatively neutral primes were presented in a task along with extremely 
negative primes, so that half the primes were negative and half were neutral (see 
left side of Figure 2).  For the other participants, the neutral primes were 
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presented in a task along with extremely positive primes, again evenly divided 
between the two types of primes (see right side of Figure 2).  (Figure 2 illustrates 
these two priming conditions in the form of an Attitude Misattribution Procedure 
(AMP) task, in which participants are instructed to identify Chinese characters as 
relatively pleasant or unpleasant, Payne et al. 2005). 
It was expected that the extremely positive and negative stimuli would 
elicit strong priming effects, and this is exactly what the authors found.  For 
example, the negative primes increased the probability of negative responses to 
the following target, and positive primes increased the probability of positive 
responses.  However, of critical interest were participants’ automatized reactions 
to the neutral prime stimuli.  According to most priming theories, the neutral 
primes should have no effect at all, since these stimuli were purposefully selected 
for their lack of strong evaluative meaning.  However, just as predicted by the 
response mapping framework, Scherer and Lambert found that the neutral stimuli 
influenced participants’ responses in a way that was surprisingly similar to effects 
typically observed for unambiguous stimuli.  When embedded among negative 
primes, neutral primes elicited priming effects analogous to those seen with 
positive primes.  Conversely, when embedded among positive primes, neutral 
primes showed properties normally associated with negative primes.  According 
to the response mapping framework, this contrast effect occurred because 
participants imposed the target categorization scheme—which included only 
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positive and negative categories—onto the primes.  In doing so, they mapped the 
neutral primes onto the positive or negative response by default, not because those 
responses reflected the actual evaluative connotations of the neutral primes 
themselves. 
In order to understand the essential elements of the response mapping 
framework, it can be heuristically useful to regard these mappings as involving 
two different stages.  (The term “stage” is used in a general sense here; the 
temporal ordering of these stages is not crucial for present purposes.)  One stage 
of the response mapping process involves mapping the “good” and “bad” 
responses onto the target stimuli. This mapping is a direct consequence of the 
kinds of instructions that participants are typically given on priming tasks (e.g. 
“whenever you see a positive word, hit the good key”).  The other stage of the 
response mapping process involves mapping responses onto the primes.   
An obvious objection could be raised at this point.  Why would 
participants do something so illogical as map stimuli onto a response that has no 
relation to the stimuli at all?  There are two answers to that objection.  First, keep 
in mind that the categorization processes occurring with the primes is happening 
unintentionally and, in all likelihood, outside of conscious awareness.  
Researchers have long recognized that automatic processing can involve the use 
of categories in ways that don’t always follow strict rules of logic and rationality, 
and this could well be one of those examples.  Second, even if participants were 
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fully aware of how they are mapping responses onto the primes, this involves 
considerations not altogether different from those pertaining to explicit ratings.  In 
the same way that people may not “really” think of elephants as particularly 
small, they may not ”really” think of wooden stools as positive or negative.   
Summary of the Response Mapping Framework 
Although our framework may seem complex, the essential details are 
actually fairly straightforward, and can be summarized as follows.   
 1. Explicit and implicit attitude tasks involve a basic process of response 
mapping, which we simply define as the process of selecting any available 
response and using it to refer to a given stimulus.   
 2. In the case of explicit rating tasks, this process is part of an intentional 
effort to judge the target stimuli.  In the case of implicit tasks, the response 
mapping process encompasses both the intentional goal to respond to the 
targets and well as the unintentional imposition of those response categories 
onto the primes.   
 3.  The response mapping process is not necessarily “rational” and 
participants may not even be aware that such a process is even occurring, 
especially as it concerns the way that participants process information about 
the primes. Rather, response mapping can be better understood as an 
unintentional process of imposing the response categories onto the primes. 
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 4.  Relatively extreme and/or unambiguous stimuli will tend, by their very 
nature, to “dominate” the response mapping process. For example, if 
participants are presented with a randomized array of unambiguously negative 
and neutral stimuli, the former stimuli will tend to stand out and will be 
assigned the most negative response option available.   
 5. Contrast can be understood as a process of judgmental displacement as 
a result of the preceding step.  In other words, after respondents have “used 
up” the available response options to refer to the unambiguous stimuli, less 
extreme or midrange stimuli will be assigned to whatever remaining response 
options are available.  This explains both why recycling (a “mid-range” social 
issue) can be rated as either important or trivial depending on whether the 
available response options have been taken up by extremely important or 
extremely trivial issues (nuclear war, sidewalk spitting, respectively).  This 
also explains why a towel could elicit automatic priming effects analogous to 
those associated with positive or negative stimuli, depending on the nature of 
the other primes presented in that context.   
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PART III:   
Evidence for the Response Mapping Framework 
Evidence for the response mapping framework was obtained by Scherer 
and Lambert (2009) using two different kinds of priming tasks: evaluative 
priming (Fazio et al, 1986) and the Attitude Misattribution Procedure (AMP; 
Payne et al. 2005).  A detailed description of these tasks can be found in 
Appendix A.  It is recommended that the unfamiliar reader review Appendix A 
before moving forward to the next section. 
Evidence for Response Mapping Using Evaluative Priming and the AMP 
 Earlier I described an experiment in which Scherer and Lambert (2009) 
found that neutral primes elicit favorable priming effects when they are presented 
in a task along with negative primes, whereas they elicit unfavorable priming 
effects when the neutral primes are presented with positive primes.  Although 
these contrasts effects provide initial evidence for the RM model, it is still 
possible that these effects were obtained because the neutral primes were actually 
perceived as being more or less favorable in the different task contexts.  However, 
in two experiments Scherer and Lambert (2009) demonstrated that response 
mapping processes better accounted for these contrast effects.  Those experiments 
are described below. 
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Testing the Response Mapping Framework: a 3-response paradigm 
 In their first test of the response mapping framework, Scherer and Lambert 
(2009) started with the following assumption:  Response mapping processes 
should be contingent upon the kinds of response options that are available in the 
task (see point 5, above).  According to the response mapping framework, 
contrast effects were observed for the neutral primes because those primes were 
displaced onto either a good or bad response.  Had a neutral response option been 
available, one would have expected the neutral primes to be mapped onto the 
neutral response, and not the negative or positive response.  Hence, if a neutral 
response option is included in the contrast paradigm (so that now there are three 
response options: good, bad and neutral), the neutral primes should facilitate the 
neutral response, and the contrast effect should disappear.   On the other hand, the 
perceptual change view assumes that the neutral primes actually took on positive 
or negative connotations when presented alongside other, unambiguous primes.  
Hence, this latter view predicts that the neutral primes should not facilitate the 
neutral response, because in the task context they are no longer neutral. 
 In Scherer and Lambert’s resultant experiment (2009, Experiment 3), 
participants performed one of two tasks, in which either positive and neutral, or 
negative and neutral primes were presented.  This aspect of the experiment was 
exactly like the previous experiments that obtained evaluative contrast.  However, 
in this experiment the targets included positive, negative and neutral words.  
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Participants were asked to identify each of the target words by indicating whether 
it was positive, negative or neutral.  The results were exactly what were predicted 
by the response mapping framework.  The neutral primes did not produce a 
contrast effect, but they did facilitate neutral responses in both of the task 
conditions.  These results indicate that when participants are provided with 
response options that fit the evaluative connotations of the primes, this relieves 
the pressure to map the primes onto responses that don’t share the same 
evaluative connotation.  Hence, the contrast effects that were obtained in previous 
experiments were probably the result of providing participants with response 
options that could not account for the evaluative connotations of the primes in the 
task.   
Testing the Response Mapping Framework: a semantic priming paradigm 
In their second test of the response mapping framework, participants were 
presented with a priming task in which they were asked to identify targets as 
either food-related words (e.g. eat, hungry) or flower-related words (e.g. bloom, 
grow) (Scherer & Lambert 2009, Experiment 4).  In one condition, the primes 
included pictures of flowers and household objects.  In another condition the 
targets and judgments were identical, but the primes consisted of food and 
household objects.  Hence, in each condition half the primes were related to one 
of the response categories (either flower or food pictures), and the other primes 
(household objects) were not related to either food or flowers.   
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In this task, the flower primes facilitated responses to flower words, and 
the food primes facilitated responses to food words.  As for the object primes, all 
extant models of priming (i.e. both spreading activation and response-based 
models) predict that the object primes should not influence responses at all, 
because they are unrelated to both of the targets/responses.  However, the 
response mapping framework uniquely predicted that the object primes would be 
mapped onto either the flower or food response, depending on the task context.  
When the object primes were presented along with flower primes, the objects 
should be mapped onto the food response, by default.  In contrast, when objects 
were presented with food, the objects should be mapped onto the flower response, 
by default.  That is, the RM model predicts that the object primes will be mapped 
onto whichever response is not already claimed by the other, unambiguous primes 
in the task.  These are exactly the results that were obtained. 
Hence, Scherer and Lambert found that the object primes acted like food 
primes when presented with flower primes, and acted like flower primes when 
presented with food primes.  It is almost impossible to argue that the object 
primes somehow seemed more “food-like” or “flower-like” in the two conditions, 
and yet these primes produced effects that were very much like food and flower 
prime stimuli.  As a result, this experiment demonstrates a situation in which 
systematic priming effects can occur in the absence of any logical relationship 
between the prime and the response.  This experiment clearly shows that 
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responses are mapped onto priming stimuli as a result of the prime context, and 
this process can occasionally result in priming effects that do no reflect the 
semantic or evaluative connotations of the primes.   
PART IV:   
Unresolved Issues in the RM Model 
 The aforementioned experiments validated the RM model.  At this point, 
the question is not whether the RM model is valid, but rather when it is valid, and 
also what sorts of implications the model has for automatically activated 
evaluations.  The RM model raises many novel and important questions for 
priming research and automatic evaluative processes.  In the following section, I 
will identify several of these questions, and discuss how they can be addressed 
with further research.  These questions and issues will lay the theoretical 
groundwork for the experiments to come. 
Unresolved Issue #1: On the Fundamental Nature of Response Mapping 
Processes: Testing the Viability of the Central vs. Peripheral View 
One longstanding issue surrounding response compatibility models is 
whether the locus of the affective priming effect is “central” or “peripheral” (for a 
relevant discussion, see Klauer & Musch, 2003).  According to the peripheral 
view, primes simply activate response tendencies, such as “use your right hand” 
(Klinger et al., 2000; Musch, 2000).  In contrast, the central view purports that 
affective priming involves a process of categorizing the primes as good or bad 
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(Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Abrams, Klinger & Greenwald, 2003; Musch, 
2000).  As I will explain below, the same issue also arises for the RM model. 
 To illustrate the distinction between the central and peripheral 
explanations of affective priming, it is useful to consider a study reported by 
Abrams and Greenwald (2000).  In this study, the researchers found that 
subliminal priming effects were stronger when participants had previously 
practiced classifying the primes as positive or negative.  However, this previous 
practicing made it unclear whether participants simply learned to associate, say, a 
positive prime with a right-hand key press (assuming that the positive key is on 
the right-hand side), or if the act of identifying the primes actually reinforced 
participants’ positive or negative associations with those stimuli.  The former 
explanation illustrates the peripheral locus view, whereas the latter explanation is 
an example of the central locus view.  In order to tease these alternate 
explanations apart, Abrams et al. (2003) performed another experiment in which 
participants were asked to classify the objects as either good or bad, and then 
perform a subliminal priming task.  Importantly, just prior to performing the 
priming task, the experimenters switched the keys that were used to make positive 
and negative responses (for example, if the positive key was on the right for the 
classification task, it was on the left for the priming task).  The authors found 
significant subliminal priming effects even when the keys were reversed, thus 
lending support for the central locus view. 
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In the RM model, a very similar issue arises.  Recall that neutral primes 
show a contrast effect when placed in a task alongside extreme negative or 
positive primes.  Importantly, it is not yet clear whether this contrast effect 
involves (a) a simple process of associating the neutral primes with a motor 
response (peripheral locus), or (b) a process of associating the neutral primes with 
an evaluative response (central locus).  According to a peripheral locus view, 
response mapping merely reflects the fact that a motor response (rather than an 
evaluative association) has been mapped onto the primes.  However, according to 
the central locus viewpoint, response mapping actually causes these neutral 
objects to take on new evaluative associations.   
To further illustrate the central locus view, imagine a priming task in 
which half of the primes are negative, and half are neutral (see left side of Figure 
2).  Participants walk into the experiment with no preexisting evaluative 
associations with the neutral primes.  Moreover, when they begin the task, the 
objects seem no more positive or negative than they would in any other context.  
However, note that in this example, the neutral primes will be mapped onto the 
positive response.  At first, this positive response will merely be a default label 
with which to refer to the household objects.  Yet as the trials proceed, 
participants will learn to respond to the objects favorably.  That is, the label that 
was once applied by default actually comes to define the objects themselves.  
Hence, response mapping may not be simply a process of learning to associate 
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primes with a particular motor response.  Instead, response mapping may involve 
learning to associate primes with an evaluative response.  Thus, priming tasks 
may have the capacity to create new evaluative associations. 
The findings reported to date—including all of the experiments reported in 
Scherer and Lambert (2009)—are equally compatible with both a peripheral and 
central locus view.  The purpose of Experiments 1 and 2 is to test the viability of 
these two respective views.  To avoid a possible misunderstanding, the purpose of 
these studies is test whether the central (evaluative based) or peripheral (motor 
based) account provides the best explanation of the findings obtained in the 
present paradigm.  However, failure to find support for the peripheral view does 
not necessarily imply that processes related to motor learning are unimportant and 
never occur.   
In order to understand the logic of the studies to follow, it is worth 
emphasizing that, according to the central locus view, response mapping results in 
changes in liking for the neutral prime stimuli.  If true, this view predicts that the 
evaluative associations that are learned in the priming task should be reflected in 
future judgments of the primes.  For example, if participants learn negative 
associations with a picture of a towel, then this towel should elicit negative 
priming effects in a different priming task (Experiment 1), and it should also be 
explicitly rated relatively negatively as well (Experiment 2).  On the other hand, if 
response mapping merely reflects a learned motor response, then the negative 
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effects for that towel should only occur in the priming task, and should not carry 
over to future judgments of that stimulus. 
Unresolved Issue #2: On the Mental Classification of Primes: On What Basis, 
Exactly, Are Participants Sorting the Primes into Different Categories?  
The RM model may, at first blush, seem difficult to reconcile with some 
past research showing that priming effects depend on associative strength.  For 
example, in an experiment by Fazio et al. (1986; Experiment 3), strongly valenced 
primes showed strong priming effects, whereas weakly-valenced primes showed 
weak effects.  Response mapping might seem to have difficulty accounting for 
such effects because the model assumes that even weak primes will be mapped 
onto a response (in which case they will produce strong priming effects), or 
alternatively, the weak primes will not be mapped at all (resulting in zero priming 
effects).  This all-or-none conceptualization of priming is not compatible with 
results such as those obtained by Fazio et al. 
 In my view, there is one particularly intriguing explanation that may 
resolve this apparent inconsistency.  Remember that one of the central tenets of 
response mapping is that participants impose the target classification scheme onto 
the primes.  In other words, response mapping relies on participants’ ability to 
take a broad, response-based classification scheme and apply it to the prime 
stimuli.  Hence, it is possible that response mapping processes may be limited to 
situations in which the primes are easily sorted into a small number of 
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homogenous categories.  For example, in Scherer & Lambert’s (2009) 
experiments, the primes always fell into two very distinct and homogenous 
categories (e.g. flowers and objects, or animals and objects).  By contrast, in the 
Fazio et al. (1986) experiments the primes included a broad array of unrelated 
words (e.g. “aquarium,” “cake” and “recession”) that did not form any coherent 
categories at all.  As a result, it’s possible that the participants in the Fazio 
experiments could not map the primes because they could not easily categorize 
them.  Under these sorts of circumstances, it is likely that other processes (such as 
spreading activation) may play a more dominant role in producing priming effects 
(I will revisit this issue in the General Discussion).   
One important implication of the above discussion is that many measures 
of implicit attitudes may actually be best understood as measures of implicit 
categorization.  That is, these tasks may specifically measure participants’ ability 
(or lack thereof) to categorically differentiate between various types of stimuli.  If 
the primes are viewed as being categorically distinct, then they are likely to be 
mapped onto separate responses.  In contrast, if the primes are categorically 
similar, then they are likely to be mapped onto the same response.   
To illustrate, turn again to Figure 1b.  This figure represents two primes 
that appeared in Scherer and Lambert’s (2009) priming experiments.  One prime 
is an extremely negative animal, and the other is a neutral household object.  In 
this situation, participants can easily dissociate between the two primes, because 
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they are evaluatively distinct (i.e. negative and neutral) and also categorically 
homogenous (animals and common household objects).  As a result, participants 
map these primes onto different responses (negative and positive, respectively).   
Now turn to Figure 3a and 3b.  These figures also represent two primes 
that might appear in a priming task.  However note that in Figure 3a the primes 
are categorically distinct (i.e. presented in greyscale or in color), but evaluatively 
identical.  One important question is whether participants will use non-evaluative 
differences between the primes—such as the presence or absence of color—as a 
basis for mapping the primes onto different evaluative responses.  If this is the 
case, then responses in a task like that represented in Figure 3a should be quite 
similar to the responses in a more typical priming task, like that represented in 
Figure 3b.  This empirical question is addressed in Experiment 3. 
Previously, I pointed out that in my past experiments all of the primes 
were a) evaluatively distinct, and b) categorically homogenous.  For example, in 
one experiment the negative primes were always animals, whereas the neutral 
primes were household objects.  Therefore, one question that remains unaddressed 
is whether response mapping occurs under circumstances in which the primes are 
evaluatively distinct, but are categorically diverse.  For example, instead of 
presenting participants with a homogenous class of neutral household objects, 
participants might be presented with neutral pictures that include a wide array of 
things, such as landscapes, household objects, animals, etc.  In Experiment 4 I 
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will vary the homogeneity of the primes, in order to determine whether or not 
response mapping processes are dependent on the homogeneity of the prime 
categories. 
Summary 
At this point, I have identified two important unanswered questions 
concerning the processes underlying response mapping.  The first question is 
whether response mapping reflects a learned motor response (the peripheral locus 
view), or if the priming task actually causes changes in liking for the neutral 
prime stimuli (the central locus view).  This question will be addressed by 
Experiments 1 and 2.  The second question asks on what basis, exactly, do 
participants classify and map the primes?  This question will be addressed by 
Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
As demonstrated by previous research (Scherer & Lambert, 2009), a prime 
that is actually neutral may, in some circumstances, be mapped onto a positive or 
negative response by default.  One interpretation of this effect is that it is a simple 
learned motor response that has absolutely no bearing on how participants feel 
toward the primes (henceforth the peripheral locus hypothesis).  However, an 
alternative view is that response mapping actually causes participants to form new 
evaluative associations with those primes (henceforth the central locus 
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hypothesis).   That is, the simple act of pairing a prime stimulus with an 
evaluative response ends up changing the way participants feel toward that 
stimulus.  The purpose of Experiment 1 is to determine whether response 
mapping is best understood as a learned motor association (the peripheral locus 
view) or learned evaluative association (central locus view) (c.f. Abrams & 
Greenwald, 2000; Abrams, Klinger & Greenwald, 2003).   
The central locus hypothesis makes two related predictions.  First, the 
associations that are formed in the initial priming task should carry over to future 
priming tasks, even if the nature of that subsequent task is different from the first.  
For example, suppose that participants are presented with two prime images; a 
towel and a threatening-looking dog.  In this circumstance, the towel will be 
mapped onto the positive response as a way of dissociating it from the dog, which 
is clearly negative.  The central locus hypothesis predicts that this act of mapping 
the towel onto a positive response will result in favorable attitudes toward the 
towel that did not exist prior to the priming task.  Hence, if the towel is then 
presented again in a second priming task, this towel will continue to elicit positive 
responses, even if the threatening dog is no longer present.  The central locus 
hypothesis additionally predicts that since the neutral primes are mapped onto an 
evaluative label, it should not matter which hand is used to make positive or 
negative responses.  Continuing with my example, the towel prime will elicit 
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positive responses in the second priming task, regardless of whether the hand that 
is used to make positive responses is the same as in the previous task, or different.   
In contrast, the peripheral locus hypothesis suggests that participants 
simply learn to associate the towel with a particular motor response, for example, 
a right or left-hand key press.  Continuing with the above example, if the positive 
label is on the right-hand side, then the towel will elicit positive right-hand 
responses.  If the positive label is then switched just prior to performing the 
second task, then the towel will continue to elicit right-hand responses even 
though the right hand now represents the negative response.  Hence, the 
peripheral locus hypothesis suggests that the towel becomes associated with a 
motor response that is not related to evaluative meaning. 
Experiment 1 tested the viability of the central locus versus peripheral 
locus hypotheses.  There were two experimental blocks in the present experiment.  
In Block 1, participants completed an AMP priming task in which negative and 
neutral, or positive and neutral, primes were presented.  It was expected that 
Block 1 would replicate previous findings, insofar as the neutral primes will 
exhibit a contrast effect (i.e. elicit positive bias in the former context and negative 
bias in the latter).  In a second block of the experiment, participants’ automatic 
attitudes toward the neutral primes were assessed again, this time using a second 
AMP task.  In the Block 2 priming task, half of the trials presented the same 
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neutral primes that participants saw in phase 1, whereas the rest of the trials 
contained a grey square control prime.   
An important factor in this experiment pertained to the position of the 
“pleasant” and “unpleasant” responses on the computer keyboard.  For half of the 
participants, the hand that was used to make pleasant and unpleasant responses 
was switched between Block 1 and Block 2.  For example, if the pleasant key was 
associated with the left hand in Block 1, it was later associated with the right hand 
in Block 2.  The purpose of this key-switching manipulation was to completely 
rule out the possibility that participants associate the neutral primes with a 
particular hand (i.e. motor response), rather than an evaluative response.  For the 
rest of participants, the key labels remained on the same side for both blocks. 
In this experiment, the central and peripheral hypotheses made two 
opposing predictions with regard to the responses that the neutral primes will 
activate in Block 2.  The central locus hypothesis predicts that in Block 2, the 
neutral primes will activate the same evaluative response that they activated in 
Block 1.  This should be true even when a different hand must be used to make 
pleasant and unpleasant responses.  In contrast, the peripheral hypothesis predicts 
that the neutral primes will activate the same hand across Block 1 and Block 2, 
irrespective of the evaluative label that is associated with that hand.   
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Participants and Design 
 Participants were 111 undergraduate students who participated in return 
for partial course credit.  This experiment was a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model 
design.  The first factor pertained to the nature of the priming context in Block 1.  
Half the participants were assigned to a task in which positive and neutral primes 
were presented, and the rest of the participants were presented with negative and 
neutral primes.  Hence, the neutral primes were presented in a “positive” or 
“negative” priming context.  The second factor pertained to the primes in the two 
tasks, in which half were always neutral, and the rest were either evaluatively 
extreme primes (Block 1) or a grey square control prime (Block 2).  The third 
factor pertained to the location of the pleasant and unpleasant keys at the 
beginning of the experiment.  For half of the participants, pleasant responses were 
made with the left hand at the start of the experiment (and unpleasant responses 
were made with the right hand), and for the rest of the participants this 
configuration was reversed.  The final factor pertained to whether the hand that 
was used to make pleasant and unpleasant responses was reversed between Block 
1 and Block 2, or not.   
Procedure 
 In Block 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, 
pertaining to the nature of the primes that appeared in the AMP priming task.  In 
the positive priming context, participants were presented with four positive and 
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four neutral primes.  In the negative priming context, participants were presented 
with four negative and four neutral primes.  Participants were told that they would 
see images flash in the center of the computer screen, and that the first image 
would be a picture.  They were told to ignore this picture (the prime), and to only 
respond to the following Chinese character target.  They were told that their job 
was to indicate whether the target was aesthetically pleasant or unpleasant, as fast 
as possible.   
 In Block 2, participants completed another AMP priming task.  In this 
block, the priming task was configured so that half of the trials presented the same 
neutral primes that participants viewed in Block 1.  On the remainder of the trials, 
a grey square (control) prime was presented.  As in Block 1, participants were told 
to ignore the primes and identify the subsequent targets as being either pleasant or 
unpleasant.  In addition, the hand that was used to make pleasant and unpleasant 
responses was switched for half the participants between Block 1 and Block 2.  
For example, if pleasant responses were made with the left hand in Block 1, then 
they were made with the right hand in Block 2.  
AMP Task Parameters 
The priming task procedure closely followed Payne et al. (2005).  On each 
trial, the rectangular prime appeared in the center of the screen for 75 
milliseconds, and was immediately followed by the target Chinese character 
which remained on the screen for 100 milliseconds.  The target was then replaced 
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by a mask that was approximately the same size and shape as the prime and target 
pictures, and which remained on the screen until participants made their 
responses.  After making their response, the next trial began immediately. 
Participants were given 6 practice trials prior to beginning the key 
experimental blocks.  As mentioned previously, each experimental block 
contained 2 types of primes, and each prime-type appeared for exactly half of the 
trials.  The presentation of the primes was randomized, and each type of prime 
was followed by one of 80 randomly selected Chinese character targets.  This 
design resulted in a total of 72 trials per block (8 primes X 9 repetitions).  
Stimuli 
 Primes consisted of 4 neutral, 4 positive and 4 negative pictures, all of 
which were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) on the basis of the normative data collected by Lang 
and his colleagues.  Four of the pictures were rated as very positive (e.g. puppies, 
kittens, rabbits; average valence rating = 7.67, average SD = 1.43), four were 
rated as very negative (e.g. a snarling dog, cockroaches, spiders; average valence 
rating = 3.73, average SD = 1.88), and four pictures received ratings around the 
midpoint of the scale (e.g. a towel, mug, lamp; average valence rating = 4.87, 
average SD = 0.99).   The IAPS scale ranged from 1 (negative) to 9 (positive).  
The targets were 80 Chinese character that were used in Payne et al. (2005).   
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Summary of Predictions 
According to the central locus hypothesis, response mapping will cause 
participants to form new evaluative associations with the neutral primes.  If this is 
true, then the evaluative associations that are learned in Block 1 should continue 
to influence participants’ responses in Block 2.  In contrast, the peripheral locus 
hypothesis assumes that response mapping produces a simple learned motor 
association.  Hence, the peripheral locus hypothesis alternatively predicts that the 
neutral primes should continue to activate whichever hand they activated in Block 
1, regardless of the evaluative label associated with that response.   
Results 
Analysis of Block 1:  Test of Contrast Effect Replication 
Data from Block 1 were coded so that pleasant responses were represented 
by the number 1, and unpleasant responses were represented by the number 0.  
For each prime type, the proportion of pleasant to unpleasant responses was 
calculated.  The resultant index ranged from 0 (representing all unpleasant 
responses) to 1 (representing all pleasant responses).  A score of 0.50 represents 
an equal number of pleasant and unpleasant responses. 
Recall that in Block 1, participants were assigned to one of two conditions, 
in which the primes were either neutral and negative, or neutral and positive.  
Hence, it was expected that Block 1 would replicate the pattern of contrast effects 
that have been obtained in numerous past experiments (Scherer & Lambert, 
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2009).  To test for that replication, a 2 (Prime: valenced vs. neutral) X 2 (Context: 
positive vs. negative) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the data from 
Block 1.  This ANOVA revealed significant a Prime X Context interaction (F (1, 
109) = 67.27, p < .001).  Table 1 shows that the contrast effects obtained in past 
research were indeed replicated.  Simple effects tests revealed that the neutral 
primes elicited significantly more pleasant responses in the negative context as 
compared to the positive context, F(1,109) = 28.74, p < .001.  Additional tests 
also revealed that, as expected, the positive primes elicited significantly more 
pleasant responses than the negative primes, F(1,109) = 50.25, p < .001.   
Analysis of Block 2  
The central and peripheral hypotheses make different predictions about the 
particular hand that participants will use to respond to the neutral primes in Block 
2.  Because of this fact, responses in Block 2 were coded to represent the hand 
that was used to make the response.  Left-hand responses were represented by the 
number 1, and right-hand responses were represented by the number 0.  For each 
prime type, the proportion of left-hand to right-hand responses was calculated.  
The resultant index ranged from 0 (representing all right-hand responses) to 1 
(representing all left-hand responses).  A score of 0.50 represents an equal number 
of right and left-hand responses. 
Recall that in Block 2, participants performed a task that presented the 
same neutral primes that were presented Block 1, along with a control prime (a 
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grey square).  The peripheral locus hypothesis predicts that in this second task, 
participants will respond to the neutral primes using the same hand that was used 
to respond to those primes in Block 1.  In contrast, the central locus hypothesis 
predicts that the neutral primes will continue to activate the same evaluative 
response as in Block 1, regardless of which hand is used to make that response.  
To analyze the primes in Block 2, a 2 (Prime: neutral vs. grey square) X 2 
(Context in Block 1: positive vs. negative) X 2 (Response Location in Block 1: 
pleasant on left vs. right) X 2 (Switch condition: switch vs. no switch) mixed-
model ANOVA was conducted.  This analysis revealed a significant 4-way 
interaction (F(1, 103) = 5.18, p < .05), which indicated that the neutral and grey 
square primes elicited a different pattern of effects.  Hence, the analyses below 
will conduct simple effects tests on the neutral and grey square control primes 
separately, in order to understand the nature of this complex interaction.   
Analysis of the neutral primes: testing the Central locus vs. Peripheral locus 
hypotheses  
The next set of analyses involves the critical predictions concerning the 
peripheral versus central hypotheses.  To test the viability of these competing 
hypotheses, I conducted analyses on the neutral primes from Block 2.  Three 
experimental factors were expected to influence participants’ responses to the 
neutral primes in Block 2: 1) the evaluative context experienced in Block 1, 2) the 
location of the pleasant and unpleasant keys at the start of the experiment, and 3) 
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whether the location of the pleasant/unpleasant keys were switched just prior to 
Block 2.  If the peripheral locus hypothesis is correct, then this will emerge as a 
Context X Key Location interaction, because the neutral primes will activate 
whichever hand they activated in Block 1, regardless of whether the keys were 
switched, or not.  However, if the central locus hypothesis is correct, then this will 
be expressed as a 3-way Context X Response Location X Switch Condition 
interaction, because when the key labels are switched just prior to Block 2, 
participants will respond to the neutral primes using the opposite hand that was 
used in Block 1.   
A UNIANOVA analysis of the neutral primes revealed a 2-way Response 
Location X Switch condition interaction (F (1,103) = 26.10, p < .001), which 
simply indicated that participants made more pleasant than unpleasant responses 
overall (this is because the hand that was used to make pleasant responses 
depended on both the location of that response in block 1, as well as whether or 
not the response configuration was switched or not).  However this interaction 
was qualified by the 3-way Context X Response location X Switch condition 
interaction that was predicted by the central locus hypothesis, F(1, 103) = 9.93, p 
< .01.  To illustrate how these results support the central locus hypothesis, turn to 
Figure 4.  The top half of Figure 4 displays the response patterns for participants 
for whom the location of the keys was not switched between blocks 1 and 2.  
Participants who were previously exposed to the negative priming context 
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responded to the neutral primes as if they were positive, whereas the reverse was 
true for participants previously exposed to the positive priming context.  This was 
true regardless of whether the “pleasant” key was on the right or left-hand side.   
The bottom half of Figure 4 displays the data that are critical to the 
predictions made by the central locus hypothesis.  These data display participants’ 
responses when the locations of the pleasant and unpleasant keys are switched just 
prior to Block 2.  Importantly, the contrast effect was still observed in this 
condition.  That is, the neutral primes activated relatively more pleasant responses 
when the previous context was negative (black bars) than positive (white bars).   
These results suggest that participants associated the neutral primes with an 
evaluative response, rather than a right or left hand response.   
Analyses Involving the Grey Square Prime 
 Next, I conducted another UNIANOVA, this time on the grey square 
control prime.  This analysis revealed a Switch condition X Response Location 
interaction (F(1, 103) = 33.58, p < .001), which again simply indicated that 
participants tended to hit the pleasant key more often than the unpleasant key.  
Also, a Location X Context interaction emerged, F(1, 103) = 3.98, p < .05.  
Although this interaction was not qualified by the switch condition manipulation 
(3-way interaction p = .12), it is useful to display the means associated with the 3-
way interaction so that a direct comparison can be made between the gray square 
and the neutral primes (recall that the precise nature of the earlier 4-way 
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interaction has yet to be examined.  The means displayed across Figures 4 and 5 
represent that 4-way interaction).  The top half of Figure 5 demonstrates that in 
the no-switch condition, the grey square elicited effects that were no different 
from that of the neutral primes (i.e. top halves of Figures 4 and 5 are not different, 
F < 1.0).  In the switch condition (bottom half of Figure 5), however, the grey 
square elicited no effects involving the previous task context (all task context 
effects F < 1.0).  In the switch condition, the effects for the grey square were 
significantly different from that of the neutral primes (i.e. bottom halves of 
Figures 4 and 5 are significantly different, p < .01).  These results lend insight 
into the 4-way interaction that was reported earlier.  Specifically, the difference 
between the neutral and grey square primes that was illustrated by that interaction 
can be explained, in part, by the lack of a contrast effect for the grey square prime 
in the switch condition.   
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provides strong evidence for the central locus hypothesis.  
That is, evaluative priming tasks can generate new evaluative associations that did 
not exist prior to the task.  This is important, because the vast majority of research 
assumes that these sorts of tasks measure preexisting attitudes, whereas the 
present research suggests that priming tasks both measure and create new 
attitudes.   
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 Experiment 1 showed that priming tasks can cause evaluative conditioning 
effects.  The RM model suggests a process by which such evaluative conditioning 
can take place: 
1) The priming task instructions ask participants to sort the target stimuli 
into good and bad categories.  As a result of these task instructions, a 
good-bad classification scheme becomes salient.   
2) The salience of the good-bad classification scheme causes participants 
to apply good and bad responses to all the stimuli in the task, including 
the primes (which they were instructed to ignore). 
3) The unambiguous primes are classified in accordance with their 
evaluative implications, as might be expected.  However, the neutral 
primes are also classified as either positive or negative (as a result of 
the RM assumptions described earlier), even though they possess no 
evaluative associations.   
4) As a result of 1-3, each time a neutral prime appears, it activates an 
evaluative response (either positive or negative, depending on the 
nature of the other primes in the task).   
5) Participants develop a new evaluative association with the neutral 
prime stimuli, as a result of step 4.  An evaluative response is now tied 
to the neutral primes, and as a result, future responses to these stimuli 
will be more positive or negative than would otherwise be the case.  
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The process described above can be referred to as task initiated categorization 
and evaluative conditioning.  That is, the task instructions initiate categorization 
of the prime stimuli, which leads to response mapping and then evaluative 
conditioning.  These effects have important implications for those who wish to 
study social attitudes, because priming tasks are generally employed as a way of 
measuring participants’ attitudes towards other people, especially outgroup 
members.  The results of a given priming task are assumed to reflect participants’ 
preexisting attitudes, but the present research suggests that the task may in fact 
create attitudes that participants did not possess when they walked into the 
experiment.  For example, if a given task shows negative bias toward the elderly 
and positive bias toward the young, it could be that the task has, in fact, created a 
negative association with the elderly that did not exist until the onset of the task. 
The effects elicited by the grey square prime were not relevant to the 
critical hypotheses that were tested in this experiment, but the effects were 
nonetheless interesting.  When the keys were not switched prior to block 2, the 
grey square activated response patterns that were virtually indistinguishable from 
those elicited by the old neutral primes.  Another way of stating this is that the 
new primes showed an assimilation effect (e.g. Strack & Schwarz, 2007).  
However, when the key location was switched, this assimilation effect 
disappeared.  It is unclear why the grey square elicited assimilation-like effects in 
the no-switch condition, but not in the switch condition.  One possible explanation 
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is that the grey square was similar enough to the neutral household objects (i.e. 
both were neutral and dull) that they could show assimilation under certain 
conditions, but that they were not sufficiently similar to show assimilation in the 
face of disruptive task changes, such as the switch in key label.  Another 
possibility is that the grey square revealed some sort of underlying response bias, 
but that this response bias cannot entirely account for the effects for the neutral 
primes.  These questions are important and interesting, and are certainly deserving 
of future exploration.  However, these questions do not qualify the central 
findings of this experiment, which demonstrated that the task caused the 
(previously) neutral stimuli to activate evaluatively meaningful responses. 
  Perhaps the most compelling implication of the central view of response 
mapping is that response mapping processes result in a new attitude toward 
previously neutral stimuli.  Importantly, this means that priming tasks may 
sometimes create, as well as measure, attitudes.  In the next experiment, I will 
further test the boundary conditions of this effect.  Specifically, I will determine 
whether overt ratings of the stimuli can also be influenced by prior response 
mapping. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
The previous experiment provided some initial evidence that response 
mapping leads to the formation of new evaluative associations.  This is important, 
because it suggests that priming tasks can both measure attitudes on one hand, and 
create attitudes on the other.  However, one limitation of Experiment 1 was that 
both the manipulation and the dependent measure were priming paradigms.  
Hence, it is possible that the “new attitudes” toward the neutral primes are only 
activated within the limited circumstances of a priming task.  For example, 
Experiment 1 showed that the neutral primes can activate “pleasant” or 
“unpleasant” priming task responses, but this does not necessarily mean that these 
primes will activate the kinds of positive or negative feelings that might be 
reflected in other, more overt or deliberate types of judgments.  Moreover, if one 
were interested in using the AMP as an evaluative conditioning paradigm, it 
would be theoretically important to know that the evaluations that are formed in 
the task will influence a broad array of behaviors and judgments, rather than 
simply influencing priming task judgments.  Hence, the purpose of the present 
experiment is to determine whether the evaluative response that is learned in the 
priming task can influence later, explicitly expressed attitudes.   
 As in Experiment 1, there were two blocks in Experiment 2.  In Block 1, 
participants completed an AMP task that was exactly like Block 1 of Experiment 
1.  However, Block 2 involved viewing the neutral primes again and explicitly 
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rating those images along three different dimensions: pleasantness/unplesantness, 
positivity/negativity, and valuable/worthless.  According to the central view of 
response mapping, participants will form new evaluations in the Block 1 priming 
task.  This new evaluation should, in turn, influence later explicit judgments of 
pleasantness, positivity and value. 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were 32 undergraduate students who participated in return for 
partial course credit.  There was one between-subjects factor in this experiment, 
pertaining to the nature of the primes that were presented in the AMP task 
(positive versus negative).   
Procedure and Stimuli 
 In Block 1, participants were randomly assigned to complete an AMP task 
that presented either positive and neutral, or negative and neutral, primes.  This 
AMP task was identical to Block 1 of Experiment 1.  In Block 2, participants 
were presented with the neutral prime images again, only this time they were 
asked to rate the images with respect to three dimensions: pleasantness-
unpleasantness, positive-negative, and valuable-worthless.  Each rating was made 
on a -4 to +4 Likert scale.  The order of the pictures was randomized, as was the 
order in which participants were asked each of the three distinct types of 
questions. 
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Summary of Predictions 
 The predictions for Experiment 2 were similar to those made for 
Experiment 1.  If the central locus view is correct—meaning that participants 
form new evaluative association with the primes—then these new associations 
should influence participants’ later, explicit evaluations of those primes.  For 
example, when the priming context is negative, then the neutral primes should be 
mapped onto the positive response.  If this response mapping process results in 
the formation of a new, positive attitude, then participants should later rate the 
neutral primes more favorably than would otherwise be the case.   
Results 
 For each of the three types of primes (positive, negative and neutral), an 
index was created that represented the proportion of pleasant to unpleasant 
responses.  This index ranged from 0 (all unpleasant responses) to 1 (all pleasant 
responses).  A score of 0.50 represents an equal number of unpleasant and 
pleasant responses.  For each type of explicit rating (pleasantness, positivity, 
value), I averaged across participants’ responses to the four neutral primes.  This 
resulted in three explicit rating indices: 1) pleasantness/unpleasantness, 2) 
positive/negative, and 3) valuable/worthlessness.   
Priming Task Results 
 Before a test of the critical hypotheses can be conducted, it is first 
important to establish that the contrast effect was replicated within the Block 1 
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priming task.  A 2 (Prime type: unambiguous vs. neutral) X 2 (Context: positive 
vs. negative) mixed model ANOVA revealed the expected contrast effect in the 
form of a 2-way Prime X Context interaction, F(1,30) = 17.08, p < .001 (see 
Table 2).  Simple effects tests revealed that the neutral primes elicited 
significantly more pleasant responses in the negative context as compared to the 
positive context, F(1,30) = 6.23, p < .05.  Additional tests also revealed that, as 
expected, the positive primes elicited significantly more pleasant responses than 
the negative primes, F(1,30) = 9.28, p < .01.   
Explicit Ratings Results 
 The central locus hypothesis predicts that the priming task (Block 1) 
should influence participants’ later explicit ratings of the neutral stimuli (Block 
2).  In order to test this hypothesis, a 3 (Type of rating: pleasant vs. positive vs. 
value) X 2 (Prior Priming Task Context: positive vs. negative) mixed-model 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of context (F(1,30) = 4.62, p < .05), indicating 
that each of the three types of ratings were influenced by the prior priming task 
context.  All other effects were not significant, p > .20.  Figure 6 displays the 
means associated with this test.  This figure shows that participants who viewed 
the neutral primes in a negative priming context later rated those primes as more 
pleasant, more positive and more valuable than participants who were exposed to 
a positive priming context.   
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Discussion 
These results call into question an important and commonly-held 
assumption about priming tasks.  Specifically, priming tasks are widely assumed 
to measure participants’ automatic associations.  Yet the present research shows 
that these tasks can both measure attitudes (in the case of the extreme primes), 
and also create attitudes where none existed previously (in the case of the neutral 
primes).  This is the first time (to my knowledge) that priming tasks have been 
proposed as vehicles for attitude creation in addition to attitude measurement. 
In Experiment 2, the initial priming task influenced participants’ 
subsequent explicit judgments of the neutral object stimuli.  When the initial 
priming context was negative, the neutral primes activated more pleasant 
responses in the priming task, and elicited more favorable overt ratings as well.  
The reverse was true when the initial task context was positive.  Moreover, every 
type of rating—pleasantness, positivity, and value—was influenced by the prior 
context.  For example, if participants responded to a picture of a towel with a 
“pleasant” key press, they also later tended to think that the towel was more 
valuable than would otherwise be the case.  Although one might have expected 
this effect to occur at least for the explicit pleasantness ratings (after all, the 
priming task also asked for pleasant and unpleasant responses), it turned out that 
the biggest effect was actually for the value rating (see Figure 6, far right bars). 
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 These results lend support for the central locus view of response mapping.  
That is, the simple act of responding to the neutral primes with a positive or 
negative key press eventually results in a positive or negative attitude toward 
those images.  In this experiment, participants do not begin the task with strong 
feelings toward the neutral primes.  However, participants finish the experiment 
with evaluative associations that were not present before the task began.  As such, 
response mapping can cause evaluative conditioning effects.  If participants make 
a “pleasant” key press every time a towel appears, they will come to view that 
towel in a positive light.  If they make an “unpleasant” response following a 
towel, then the towel will later be perceived as negative. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 addressed some important implications of the 
response mapping model.  In the next two experiments, I will shift the focus 
slightly and instead explore some of the potential boundary conditions of the 
response mapping model.   Hence, the purpose of Experiments 3 and 4 is to 
identify conditions in which response mapping is, or is not, likely to occur.   
Experiment 3 addresses two different proposed forms of the RM model.  
One form, which I will refer to as the “strong” form of response mapping, 
suggests that participants will always map the primes onto separate responses, so 
long as there are two or more classes of primes that are categorically distinct, and 
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regardless of whether the primes differ on an evaluative dimensions.  However, 
another view of the model is that response mapping has at least one clear 
boundary condition, which is that the primes must be evaluatively distinct in order 
for participants to map the primes onto the positive and negative responses.  I will 
refer to this latter view as the “evaluative distinctiveness” hypothesis.  The 
evaluative distinctiveness hypothesis fits well with current conceptualizations of 
priming, which assume that priming effects are the result of the evaluative 
implications of the primes.  The strong form of RM, however, suggests that 
priming effects can and do occur, even in the absence of any strong evaluations 
toward any of the primes. 
To illustrate the strong form of response mapping, turn to Figures 3a and 
3b.  In this figure, there are two prime images (in this case, two faces).  In Figure 
3a, both of the primes are the same male face, wearing a neutral expression, but 
one of the faces is presented in color, and the other is presented in black-and-
white.  In contrast, in Figure 3b the two faces have different evaluative 
connotations (happy and angry).  The strong form of the RM model predicts that 
priming effects will occur in both Figure 3a and 3b:  In Figure 3b, the primes will 
be mapped onto different responses because the primes are evaluatively distinct.  
Importantly, in Figure 3a, the primes will also be mapped onto different 
responses, because the color (and lack thereof) of the primes will act as an 
evaluative dimension.  That is, participants will identify the fact that there are two 
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distinct types of faces (color and grayscale), and then will choose a positive or 
negative response to refer to each type of prime, perhaps because they have a mild 
preference for color images over grayscale (or vice versa).  Hence, the strong 
form of the RM model predicts participants who are shown primes like those 
illustrated in Figure 3a will show significant priming effects, even though the 
primes in that condition have no obvious evaluative connotations. 
In the case of Figure 3a, the arrows suggest that the color prime is mapped 
onto the positive response, and the grayscale prime is mapped onto the negative 
response.  That is, the figure assumes that participants have a preference for color 
over grayscale.  However, participants could easily map the primes in the opposite 
fashion, perhaps as a result of a preference for grayscale over color.  Yet 
regardless of how participants map the primes, the strong form of the RM model 
suggests that participants will always end up strongly associating the primes with 
an evaluative response, because of slight preferences for one group of primes over 
another group.   
Now suppose that the strong form of RM is true, and about half the 
participants prefer color images and half prefer grayscale.  How would these 
preferences be reflected in the group data as a whole?   The answer is that if one 
were to average across all of the participants, then it would appear as though the 
sample as a whole possesses no particular preference at all.  That is, a null effect 
(i.e. approximately equal effects for both primes) would be obtained.  Yet that 
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“null effect” would actually conceal strong priming effects for each individual 
participant.  In sum, if half of the sample has one set of preferences, and the rest 
of the sample has an opposite set of preferences, then the sample as a whole will 
appear to have no preferences at all.  This can explain how the strong form of the 
RM model could potentially be true, even when researchers sometimes obtain null 
findings. 
Of course, it remains to be determined whether this strong form of the RM 
model has any merit.  According to the alternative evaluative distinctiveness 
hypothesis, the evaluative implications of the primes play a crucial role in 
producing priming effects.   To illustrate, turn again to Figure 3a, in which the 
primes are categorically distinct but evaluatively identical.  The evaluative 
distinctiveness hypothesis predicts that participants will simply fail to map any of 
the primes in this case, because they all share the same evaluative connotation.  
However, the evaluative distinctiveness hypothesis does predict that priming will 
occur in circumstances where the primes have different evaluative connotations, 
such as the task displayed in Figure 3b.   
 The purpose of Experiment 3 is to test the strong form of the response 
mapping framework, and compare it to the alternative evaluative distinctiveness 
hypothesis.  In this experiment, participants completed a single priming task in 
which the primes were just like those displayed in either Figure 3a or Figure 3b.  
The strong RM model predicts that equal priming effects will be obtained in both 
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conditions.  The evaluative distinctiveness view predicts that priming effects will 
only obtain when the primes have clear evaluative connotations, such as in Figure 
3b.   
Participants and Design 
 A total of 39 students participated in this experiment in return for partial 
course credit.  There was one between-subjects factor in this experiment, 
pertaining to the nature of the primes presented in the priming task.  In one 
condition, the primes were faces that were distinguishable only on the basis of 
whether they were presented in color or not.  I will henceforth refer to this as the 
non-evaluative priming condition.  In the other task, all of the primes were 
presented in color, but they were evaluatively distinct; that is, half of the primes 
were clearly positive (happy), and the rest were clearly negative (angry).  I will 
refer to this as the evaluative priming condition. 
Procedure 
 All participants were randomly assigned to complete one of the two AMP 
tasks.  The trial configuration and timing of the AMP tasks was identical to 
Experiments 1 and 2.  However, in the present experiment, all of the primes were 
White male faces.   
In the non-evaluative priming condition, the primes were pictures of four 
men, each of whom were wearing a neutral expression.  For half the trials, these 
four faces were presented in color.  For the rest of the trials, the faces were 
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presented in grayscale.  In the evaluative priming condition, the primes were 
pictures of the same four men.  However, in this second task, the men were 
wearing positive expressions in half of the trials, and negative expressions for the 
other half of trials.  After participants completed the AMP task, they were asked 
to rate the pleasantness of each of the pictures that they saw in the priming task on 
a -4 to +4 Likert scale.   
Stimuli 
Stimuli were created using FaceGen software.  There were four White 
male faces used as primes in this experiment.  Each face was altered so that it 
expresses positive, neutral, and negative emotions.  Hence, there were 12 different 
face stimuli in total (4 faces X 3 expressions).   
FaceGen allows the user to manipulate the emotional expression of each 
face by moving tabs that correspond to the eyes, mouth, eyebrows, etc.  The 
negative faces in this experiment conveyed anger (rather than sadness or anxiety).  
The extremely negative faces were constructed by moving the “anger” tab in 
FaceGen to the 100%.  This resulted in a face that possessed the maximum 
amount of expressed anger, allowable by FaceGen, and includes furrowed 
eyebrows, squinted eyes, and a snarling mouth (see Figure 3b).   
The positive faces in this experiment conveyed happiness.  Since there is 
no “happiness” tab in FaceGen, these faces were created by moving individual 
components of the face.  These extremely positive faces were constructed by 
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using a combination of 100% smile closed, 100% smile open, 100% eyebrows up, 
and 50% eye squint.  These features correspond to what has been defined as a 
Duchenne smile.  The neutral faces were constructed by setting all of FaceGen’s 
emotional expression tabs to zero. 
Summary of Predictions 
 The strong form of the response mapping model predicts that, so long as 
there is some kind of categorical difference between the primes, participants will 
map these primes onto separate “pleasant” and “unpleasant” responses.  
Participants are expected to map the primes onto separate responses even when 
the primes are evaluatively neutral and distinguishable only on the basis of the 
presence or absence of color.  Alternatively, response mapping may rely on the 
presence of an evaluative distinctiveness between the primes.  More generally, 
this view predicts that response mapping will only occur if the primes can be 
sorted according to the categories that are specified by the response labels.  If this 
latter hypothesis is correct, then we should find much stronger response mapping 
when the primes are evaluatively distinct, but little or no response mapping when 
the primes are evaluatively similar.   
Results 
For each of the four types of primes (happy, angry, neutral- grayscale, 
neutral-color), an index was created that represented the proportion of pleasant 
versus unpleasant responses.  This index ranged from 0 (all unpleasant responses) 
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to 1 (all pleasant responses).  A score of 0.50 represents an equal number of 
unpleasant and pleasant responses.  
Data Analysis Strategy 
 In this section I will describe in detail the procedure that was used to 
analyze the data and test the two opposing hypotheses (the strong RM model vs. 
the evaluative distinctiveness hypothesis).  Recall that in one condition, primes 
included grayscale and color pictures of men wearing neutral expressions (see 
Figure 3a).  In this non-evaluative priming condition, it could easily be the case 
that half of the participants prefer the color primes whereas the rest prefer the 
grayscale primes.  If this turns out to be the case, then averaging across all the 
participants will result in a null effect, because any given prime will tend to elicit 
pleasant responses from half the sample and unpleasant responses from the rest of 
the sample.  As a result of these considerations, it is necessary to create an index 
that represents the difference in response rates to the two types of primes, but that 
is indifferent to the particular (pleasant or unpleasant) response that is activated 
by any given prime.   
To arrive at such an index, I first calculated the proportion of pleasant 
responses for each prime-type.  This resulted in four indices, one each for the 
happy, angry, neutral-color and neutral-grayscale primes.  Next, I subtracted the 
effect for one prime category from the effect for the other prime category, to 
arrive at a difference score.  For example, in the evaluative priming condition, this 
 lxxi 
 
difference score was the difference between the angry and happy primes.  In the 
non-evaluative condition, this score was the difference between the grayscale and 
color primes.  Finally, I took the absolute value of that difference score.  The 
resulting index ranged from 0 (no difference between the effects for the two types 
of primes) to 1 (one prime category elicited 100% pleasant responses, while the 
other prime category elicited 100% unpleasant responses).  Hence, this index 
reflects the difference between participants’ responses to each type of prime, 
irrespective of which particular response each prime happened to facilitate.  This 
index can be thought of as a direct measure of response mapping, with high 
numbers indicating that the primes activated completely separate responses (i.e. 
strong response mapping), and lower numbers indicating that the primes don’t 
activate any particular response (i.e. little or no response mapping).  I will 
henceforth refer to this index as the response mapping score. 
Traditional Analysis of the Priming Data 
 The purpose of this section is to perform priming task analyses of the sort 
that are traditionally used in this area of research. Such analyses typically involve 
testing for differences in response rates for the primes in the task.  Since this was 
not a crossed design, a 2 (evaluative vs. non-evaluative condition) X 2 (prime 
type) analysis is not meaningful.  Instead, I separately analyzed the response rates 
for the primes in each between-subjects condition.  In the evaluative priming 
condition, the angry primes elicited significantly fewer pleasant responses than 
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the happy primes, F(1,18) = 15.01, p < .001.  In the non-evaluative condition 
there was no difference between the color and grayscale primes, F(1,19) = 1.73, p 
> .20.   
Testing the Critical Hypotheses 
 The strong form of the response mapping model predicts that the primes in 
both the evaluative and non-evaluative conditions will activate strong priming 
effects.  The previous analyses showed that the non-evaluative condition did not 
produce significant effects when averaging across the entire sample.  However, as 
I have previously explained, it could be the case that strong preferences are in fact 
hidden by collapsing across the sample as a whole.  Hence, to test the viability of 
the two hypotheses, a response mapping score was calculated for each type of 
prime using the methods described earlier (i.e. the absolute value of the difference 
between the primes, for each individual participant).  Hence, each participant 
received a score that reflected the degree to which he or she tended to associate 
the primes with a particular positive or negative response.   
As predicted by the evaluative distinctiveness hypothesis, the non-
evaluative condition produced significantly less response mapping (M = .11, SD = 
.09) than the evaluative priming condition (M = .35, SD = .33), F(1, 37) = 10.10, 
p < .01.  That is, participants tended to show a much stronger preference for one 
prime over the other when the primes had clear evaluative implications, relative to 
when they did not.  However, it should be noted that the index was indeed 
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significantly different from zero in both the evaluative and non-evaluative 
conditions (t = 5.38 and 4.62, respectively, both p < .001).  Hence, these data 
show that response mapping processes are significantly weakened (but not absent 
altogether) when the primes lack strong evaluative meaning.  These data do not 
support the strong form of response mapping, which predicted that equal amounts 
of response mapping should occur across the evaluative and non-evaluative 
conditions.  Instead, these data are more consistent with the evaluative 
distinctiveness view.     
Analysis of Explicit Ratings 
 Immediately after completing the priming task, participants were asked to 
explicitly rate the images that they had seen in the task.  Participants in the 
evaluative priming condition rated the angry faces much more negatively than the 
happy faces (F(1,18) = 321.55, p < .001).  Participants in the non-evaluative 
priming condition did not rate the color and grayscale faces differently, F(1,19) = 
1.00, p > .30.  These results parallel the findings from the priming task.  Hence, 
both explicit and implicit evaluations show strong differences between the happy 
and angry primes, and no difference between the neutral color and grayscale 
primes. 
However, like the priming task, it is possible that participants did indeed 
perceive an evaluative difference between the color and grayscale faces, but that 
half preferred the color images whereas the rest preferred grayscale (note that this 
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logic is identical to that used in the preceding section).  To explore this 
possibility, I created an explicit response mapping index that was analogous to the 
response mapping scores used in the preceding analyses (i.e. the absolute value of 
the difference between participants’ ratings of the two types of images).  That 
index ranged from 0 (faces were liked equally) to 9 (faces were rated using 
opposite ends of the Likert scale).  (The scale ranged from 0 to 9 because 
responses were made on a -4 to +4 Likert scale.)  A UNIANOVA involving the 
resultant index revealed that, just like the priming data, the explicit response 
mapping score for the angry and happy faces (M = 4.92, SD = 1.19) was 
significantly greater than the response mapping score for the color and black-and-
white faces (M = .98, SD = .76), F(1,37) = 152.77, p < .001.  Also mirroring the 
priming data, both of these indices were significantly different from zero (t = 
17.93, 5.73 for the evaluative and non-evaluative conditions, respectively, both p 
< .001).   
Discussion 
 The strong form of the RM model states that participants will map any 
categorically distinct primes onto the available responses, even if the primes have 
no evaluative connotations whatsoever.  Experiment 3 did not support that view.  
When the primes belonged to two neutral categories, little or no RM was 
observed.  However, when the primes belonged to two evaluative categories, one 
extremely negative and the other extremely positive, the primes were clearly 
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mapped onto the negative and positive responses, respectively. Instead of showing 
evidence for the strong form of the response mapping model, these data illustrate 
that one necessary condition for response mapping is that at least one of the 
primes must have clear evaluative connotations.  While this may seem obvious in 
retrospect, this represents an important boundary condition of the RM model that 
was not evident prior to the present experiment.   
 At this point it is worth revisiting the contrast effects that were obtained in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  In those experiments, only half of the primes were extreme, 
and the rest were neutral.  Hence, the two types of primes were always 
evaluatively distinct, even though half of the primes had no particular evaluative 
connotations.  The present experiment hypothesized that perhaps evaluative 
distinctiveness is a critical factor that is necessary for response mapping to take 
place.  The data showed that this was indeed the case.  Hence, one way to 
summarize what has been learned about the RM model thus far is that while the 
prime categories must be evaluatively distinct to activate RM, it is not critical that 
all primes have strong evaluative implications (instead, only half of the primes 
must have strong evaluations, and the rest can be neutral).   
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EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 4 examines another boundary condition of the RM model.  
Specifically, Experiment 4 addresses whether RM depends on the presence of 
obvious, homogenous prime categories, or not.  In all but one of my past RM 
experiments, the primes not only had clearly different evaluative connotations, 
they were also members of discrete classes of objects as well (e.g. animals vs. 
objects).  One possibility is that participants’ ability to map the primes onto one or 
the other response depends, in part, on their ability to easily detect categorical 
differences between the primes (in addition to detecting evaluative differences).  
If this is the case, then participants should show stronger priming effects when the 
primes consist of negative animals and neutral objects (for example), than if the 
negative and neutral images do not form any coherent internal category of objects.  
However, an alternative possibility is that response mapping may occur under any 
conditions in which the primes are evaluatively distinct, irrespective of whether 
each evaluative category has any internal coherence.  In this case, participants’ 
performance should be unaffected by the homogeneity of the prime categories, 
but instead should simply be contingent on the evaluative connotations of the 
primes. 
In the present experiment, participants completed a priming task in which 
the primes were evenly divided between two evaluative groups (positive and 
neutral, or negative and neutral).  In this respect, the present experiment was the 
 lxxvii 
 
same as block one in Experiments 1 and 2.  However, the categorical 
homogeneity within each of those evaluative groups was experimentally 
manipulated (see Figure 7).  Figure 7 displays the prime images that were 
presented in each of the four experimental conditions.  The top half of Figure 7 
displays the homogenous category condition, in which the extreme primes 
constituted an internally consistent semantic category (note that “homogeneous” 
refers to the semantic quality of the primes, not their evaluative connotations.  All 
of the primes belonged to an evaluatively homogenous category.)  In this 
condition, all of the extreme primes belonged to the category “animals”.  The 
neutral primes, however, did not constitute any particular category of objects, and 
included a diverse array of images, such as a hanging light bulb and a 
checkerboard pattern.   
The bottom half of Figure 7 displays the heterogeneous category 
condition.  In this condition, none of the primes created an internally consistent 
semantic category (although note that the primes still constituted two different 
evaluative categories).  For example, the negative primes consisted of pictures of 
a tornado, skulls, a man with a gun, and a crying boy.  None of these primes can 
be easily identified as belonging, a priori, to a single category of objects.   
The critical question at hand is whether response mapping depends on 
participants’ ability to categorize the primes, or not.  If response mapping is 
dependent on ease of categorization, then priming effects should be bigger in the 
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homogenous category condition (top half of Figure 7) than in the heterogeneous 
category condition (bottom half of Figure 7).  On the other hand, if response 
mapping is not affected by the coherence of the prime categories, then response 
mapping should occur in both conditions, because both conditions present 
evaluatively distinct groups of objects. 
Participants and Design 
 There were 75 undergraduate students who participated in this experiment 
in exchange for partial course credit.  This experiment consisted of one within-
subjects factor, pertaining to the nature of the two types of primes in the AMP 
task (neutral vs. unambiguous).  There were also two between-subjects factors 
(see Figure 7), the first of which pertained to whether the unambiguous primes 
were positive or negative.  The second between-subjects factor pertained to the 
homogeneity within the prime categories.  Approximately half of the participants 
were assigned to the homogenous category condition, and the rest were assigned 
to the homogeneous category condition.   
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to complete one of the four AMP 
tasks (see Figure 7).  The AMP timing and configuration was exactly the same as 
the previous experiments.  After completing the AMP task, participants were 
debriefed and dismissed. 
 
 lxxix 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were selected from the IAPS collection (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008) on the basis of the normative data collected by Lang and his 
colleagues.  In the homogenous category condition, the average affect rating of 
the unambiguous animal primes was 3.73 and 7.67, for the negative and positive 
animals, respectively.  In the heterogeneous category condition, the average 
ratings of the negative and positive primes were 2.94 and 7.75, respectively.  The 
neutral primes were the same across the homogenous and heterogeneous 
conditions, and these primes received an average rating of 5.09.  An observant 
reader will note that the ratings for the unambiguous primes in the heterogeneous 
condition were slightly more extreme that those in the homogenous condition.  
Rather than being a fatal flaw, this actually provides a strong test of my 
hypothesis.  If anything, one would expect response mapping to become stronger 
as the primes get more extreme, and so according to this view RM should be 
strongest in the heterogeneous condition.  However, I predict that exactly the 
opposite will occur; namely, that little or no response mapping will occur in the 
heterogeneous condition, because the primes cannot be as easily categorized. 
Summary of Predictions 
Earlier, I considered the possibility that priming tasks reflect a 
categorization process.  If this is true, then RM may depend on the ease with 
which participants can categorize the primes.  When the primes belong to a 
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homogenous semantic category, participants may have an easier time categorizing 
the primes compared to when the primes do not belong to a homogenous 
category.  Hence, the typical contrast effects that we find for neutral primes may 
be blunted when the primes are heterogeneous, compared to when the primes are 
clear members of a homogenous category.   
RESULTS 
For each of the five prime categories (neutral, homogenous-negative, 
homogenous-positive, heterogeneous-negative, heterogeneous-positive), an index 
was created that represented the proportion of pleasant versus unpleasant 
responses.  This index ranged from 0 (all unpleasant responses) to 1 (all pleasant 
responses).  A score of 0.50 represents an equal number of unpleasant and 
pleasant responses.  
 A 2 (Prime: unambiguous vs. neutral) X 2 (Unambiguous prime: negative 
vs. positive) X 2 (Category condition: heterogeneous vs. homogenous) mixed-
model ANOVA revealed a Prime X Context interaction (F(1,71) =11.10, p < .01), 
however this effect was qualified by a 3-way Prime X Context X Cateogry 
condition interaction, F(1,71) = 3.92, p = .05 (see Figure 8). This 3-way 
interaction signified that, as predicted, response mapping occurred in the 
homogenous condition, but not in the heterogeneous condition.  Simple effects 
tests confirmed that in the homogenous prime condition there was a significant 
Prime X Context interaction, F(1,35) = 8.69, p < .01.  This interaction signified 
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that the positive primes elicited relatively more pleasant responses as compared to 
the negative primes (p < .05).  However, in the heterogeneous condition there 
were no significant effects at all (all p > .10).  In fact, in the heterogeneous 
condition even the difference between the unambiguously negative and positive 
primes was not significant (p > .3). 
Discussion 
 Experiment 4 demonstrated that evaluative priming effects are 
significantly influenced by the categorical coherence of the primes.  According to 
most common models of evaluative priming (e.g. spreading activation, response 
competition), the effect for any given prime should be the result of its evaluative 
implications, not its categorical membership.  However the present experiment 
shows that even an extreme prime—such as skulls and guns—will not produce 
any discernible priming effect when its category membership is unclear.   
In my past experiments (both in this dissertation and those described in the 
introduction),  the primes were easily sorted into two categories that differed in 
both their semantic meaning (animal/object) and evaluative implications 
(good/bad).  In this respect, those past experiments were quite similar to the 
majority of past research in this area, which typically contrasts just two or three 
distinct types of primes (see Fazio et al. 1986; Fazio et al. 1995; Payne et al. 
2005).  However, in the present experiment, the primes always belonged to 
different evaluative categories, but they did not necessarily belong to clear-cut 
 lxxxii 
 
semantic categories.  In the heterogeneous condition, the lack of categorical 
clarity seemed to obscure the fact that there were, in fact, two classes of 
evaluative stimuli.  As a result, no evaluative priming effects occurred at all in 
this condition.  Not only was there no contrast for the neutral prime, but there was 
also no discernible effect for the unambiguous primes, either.  By contrast, in the 
homogenous condition the primes were easier to categorize, and as a result these 
primes produced significant priming effects. 
The RM model provides a good framework with which to understand the 
present effects.  According to that model, participants sort the primes and map 
them onto the response options.  When participants have a difficult time sorting 
the primes, they will be unable to map those primes onto a response.  Hence, 
participants do not respond to each individual prime, but instead respond to the 
prime categories as a whole.  When the primes aren’t easily categorized, even the 
strongest of primes—such as human skulls—do not exert a strong influence on 
participants’ judgments.   
The present findings may seem inconsistent with past research that has 
found strong priming in the absence of homogeneous prime categories.  For 
example, Payne et al. (2005) used a multitude of heterogeneous prime stimuli, and 
yet still found significant priming effects for both negative and positive stimuli 
using the AMP.  However, there is one key difference between our respective 
experiments that could potentially explain this discrepancy. In Payne et al.’s 
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experiments, the primes were selected so that half of the primes were very 
positive, and half were very negative.  In contrast, in the present research, extreme 
primes were always contrasted with neutral primes.  Hence, one possible 
explanation is that in Payne et al.’s experiments, the extremity of the primes’ 
evaluative connotations made the categorical boundaries between the primes very 
obvious, even in the absence of semantic homogeneity.  However, in the present 
research, it is likely that participants needed additional “help” categorizing the 
primes (in the form of semantic homogeneity), because the prime connotations 
did not represent opposite ends of an evaluative spectrum.  These postulates are 
clearly in need of formal testing.  Nonetheless, the present experiment raises a 
number of important issues with regard to priming that would not have been 
apparent in the absence of the response mapping framework. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The RM model proposes a new way of understanding priming tasks and 
automatic behaviors more generally.  The model states that salient goals influence 
how people classify stimuli in their environment.  Importantly, it does not 
particularly matter whether participants have the expressed intent to categorize 
those stimuli or not.  Instead, the classification process can be an unintentional 
consequence of the salient goal at hand.  For example, a starving person might 
classify everything in his environment as edible or inedible, even if he is not 
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explicitly thinking about classification per se.  Another important point is that the 
particular category label that ends up being associated with an object depends 
largely on the array of things that are in the person’s environment.  When 
presented with a poisonous-looking berry, for example, the starving man might 
end up classifying it as edible if there is nothing else available that is remotely 
edible, whereas it may be classified as potentially poisonous—and therefore 
inedible—if better food options can be found.  Hence, our perception of objects is 
the result of both salient goals and perceptual context.   
 The RM model is a model of automatic judgment.  Hence, the processes 
involved in deciding whether to eat a berry (or not) are very similar to the kinds of 
automatic judgments that are involved in priming tasks.  In priming tasks, a goal 
is made salient by the experiment instructions.  These instructions typically ask 
participants to sort the targets into two distinct categories (e.g. good-bad, gun-
tool, etc.).  This salient categorization goal is then applied to all of the stimuli in 
the task, including the primes (which participants are supposed to ignore).  The 
net effect of these processes is that participants learn to associate the primes with 
the task responses.  That is, participants “map” the primes onto the available 
responses.   
Sometimes the connotations of the primes don’t exactly fit the 
connotations of the responses in the priming task.  Neutral primes, for example, 
don’t fit the typical evaluative priming response labels, which are usually 
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“positive” and “negative”.  Hence, just as a potentially hazardous berry can be 
categorized as either edible or inedible depending on the availability of other 
foods, a neutral stimulus can be categorized as either positive or negative, 
depending on the particular task context.  If a neutral prime is compared with 
something that is unambiguously bad, then the neutral stimuli will be categorized 
as good, and vice versa.  The upshot of these considerations is that a neutral prime 
can elicit effects that appear to reflect strong prepotent evaluations, but that in fact 
reflect the way in which participants automatically categorize and map the primes.  
This conclusion has important implications for implicit attitude research, because 
it is generally assumed that priming tasks tap directly into participants’ 
automatized evaluations. 
The main purpose of the present research was to resolve two important 
and as-yet unaddressed issues regarding the RM model.  The first question, which 
was addressed by Experiments 1 and 2, concerned the nature of the association 
that forms between primes and responses.  The second question, which was 
addressed by Experiments 3 and 4, concerned the boundary conditions of 
response mapping processes.  Since these two questions are rather distinct, I will 
discuss the answers to, and implications of, these questions in separate sections, 
below. 
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Experiments 1 and 2: Implications, Limitations and Future Directions 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that simply performing a brief AMP priming 
task can cause lasting changes in the way participants’ perceive the prime stimuli.  
When neutral primes had previously appeared along with extremely negative 
primes, they continued to elicit relatively favorable responses, both on a second 
priming task and on explicit scale ratings.  In contrast, the neutral primes elicited 
relatively negative implicit and explicit scores when they had previously appeared 
alongside extremely positive stimuli.   
Participants almost certainly did not begin the task with strong feelings 
toward the neutral primes.  However, participants clearly finished each 
experiment with relatively positive or negative evaluative associations toward 
those prime stimuli.  These results suggest that sequential priming tasks have the 
power to create new attitudes where none existed previously.  This finding rests in 
contrast to the majority of the evaluative priming literature, which largely 
assumes that priming tasks measure attitudes, and do not create them. 
The present data demonstrated that the AMP task can measure attitudes 
when the primes are extreme, but cause evaluative conditioning when the primes 
are not extreme.  Hence, these data suggest that in cases where all of the primes 
are extreme, then evaluative conditioning will not occur.  In light of this fact, one 
might make the faulty assumption that evaluative conditioning is not a concern for 
the vast majority of research on implicit attitudes.  After all, researchers usually 
 lxxxvii 
 
assume that the primes that they select have strong evaluative connotations.  
However, it is important to recognize that researchers often don’t know, a priori, 
how participants feel toward the prime stimuli.  For example, a researcher might 
assume that a particular prime is negative (perhaps because it elicits negative 
priming effects), when in fact it is neutral.  Or, to make matters more complex, a 
particular prime might be negative for one person but neutral for another.  This 
latter case may be especially true for complex social stimuli.  The present research 
suggests that the outcome of a priming measure cannot be viewed as support for 
researchers’ assumptions about the evaluative implications of their primes.  If a 
particular prime stimulus happens to exhibit negative priming effects, this could 
be due to a) a preexisting negative association, or b) a new negative association 
that was learned in the task.  For example, much research has shown that in a 
priming task involving Black and White primes, the Black primes typically evoke 
negative responses whereas the White primes evoke positive responses.  The 
present research suggests that we cannot necessarily say whether the White 
primes are indeed positive (or the Black primes negative), because either of those 
effects could be due to pre-existing associations, or new associations that were 
learned as a result of the task itself. 
Attitude Creation via Response Mapping 
The effects observed in the present research can be understood as a 
consequence of response mapping.  According to the response mapping model, 
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participants mapped the neutral primes onto a pleasant or unpleasant response, not 
because they literally perceived those primes as pleasant or unpleasant, but rather 
because participants assigned the neutral primes to whichever response is not 
already “taken up” by the extreme primes (Scherer & Lambert, 2009).  Hence, 
one important concept that runs throughout the present research is that the initial 
assignment of the neutral primes to the “pleasant” or “unpleasant” keys is not 
necessarily the result of an evaluative process.  This was one of the major points 
made by Scherer & Lambert (2009).   
The present research extends that earlier research by suggesting that one 
consequence of response mapping is that participants ended up perceiving the 
primes differently.  Specifically, participants end up viewing the primes in 
accordance with the evaluative implications of the mapped response.  Hence, 
response mapping can be likened to an evaluative conditioning process.  For 
example, if participants make a “pleasant” key press every time a picture of a 
towel appears, they will come to view that towel in a positive light.   
On the Automaticity of Evaluative Conditioning 
 Research on implicit attitudes has long made a distinction as to the various 
ways in which an evaluation can be “automatic” (Bargh, 1994).  On one hand, 
something can be said to be “automatic” if it is unintentional.  It appears that the 
evaluative conditioning described here is automatic in this sense.  In spite of the 
fact that participants were supposed to ignore the primes, participants 
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unintentionally categorized the primes and learned to associate those primes with 
a response.  Therefore, in the present research it is reasonable to assume that an 
unintentional process led to evaluative conditioning.   
However, automaticity can also refer to the extent to which participants 
are able to control their responses.  On this point, the automaticity of evaluative 
conditioning is less clear.  It is possible that participants could control their 
tendency to map the neutral primes, if one were to ask them to do so, but the 
present data do not speak to this issue.  Moreover, automaticity can also refer to 
participants’ awareness of the processes involved in the task.  It is possible, for 
example, that participants were aware that they used the positive or negative 
response to refer to the neutral primes.  However, it is equally likely that 
participants were mostly unaware of the mapping processes that occurred in the 
task.  More research is clearly needed to clarify these issues. 
Implications for the Literature on Contrast Effects 
Contrast phenomena are familiar to most psychologists, in part because 
they are so ubiquitous.  Contrast effects have been demonstrated in judgments that 
are quite diverse, from rating the importance of recycling, to judging the 
heaviness of lifted weights (Helson, 1947; Sherman, Ahlm, Berman & Lynn, 
1978).  Despite the ubiquity of contrast effects, an important and difficult issue 
has riddled the contrast literature for years.  That issue pertains to whether 
contrast effects result from a change in people’s perception of the stimuli, or 
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instead are the result of a change in the way people use the rating scales (for a 
discussion of this issue, see Scherer & Lambert, 2009).  To illustrate the latter 
case, imagine a situation in which participants are asked to rate the size of a 
mouse.  When compared to an elephant, a mouse might be described as “very 
small”.  But when compared to an amoeba, that same mouse might be described 
as “very large”.   Importantly, using the different labels reflects a change in how 
“large” and “small” are defined, not in a change in how participants perceive the 
size of the mouse.   
A definitive resolution of this issue was never reached.  It was Sherman et 
al. (1978) who first suggested that both views might be correct.  Those authors 
proposed that people may initially select a particular response because of the way 
that the context causes them to use the scale.  However, this act of response 
selection may, in fact, form a stable association between the stimulus and 
response.  The response association becomes, in effect, a bonafide change in 
perception.  Using the above example, a mouse might be assigned the label “very 
large” when compared to an amoeba, even though participants know that the 
mouse is not any bigger than when it is compared to elephants.  However, this act 
of assigning the “very large” label to the mouse will then cause the mouse to be 
perceived as being somewhat larger than would otherwise be the case.  
The present research suggests that Sherman was probably correct.   The 
contrast effects observed in the present experiments were almost certainly caused, 
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at least initially, by a response mapping process that was not a reflection of 
participants’ evaluations per se.  However, the act of mapping the prime stimuli 
onto an evaluative response resulted in a lasting change in the way that 
participants responded to the stimuli.  Hence, the act of choosing a response to 
refer to a given stimulus resulted in a new attitude. 
Directions for Future Research 
The present research suggests numerous avenues for future research.  I 
have already suggested that it will be important to explore the various ways in 
which the present effects could be labeled “automatic”.  Evaluative conditioning 
in the AMP is probably unintentional, but it remains to be determined whether it 
is also uncontrollable and inaccessible to conscious thought.  Another important 
avenue for future research is to determine the longevity of the evaluative 
conditioning effects.  It could be that the association between prime and response 
lasts only a few minutes, or alternatively, it could potentially last for hours or 
even days.  Additional research is needed to determine which of these possibilities 
is correct.   
Additionally, the present research focused on primes that were not social 
in nature.  Future research should apply these methods to a wide range of social 
stimuli, in various combinations, to determine what kinds of social stimuli are 
most likely to be subject to evaluative conditioning effects in the AMP.  For 
example, research has shown that elderly primes generally elicit negative 
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responses when they are placed in a task alongside extremely positive primes (e.g. 
Scherer & Lambert, 2009, Experiment 6).  As I have already discussed, this sort 
of finding could potentially reflect preexisting negative attitudes, or alternatively 
it could reflect new negative attitudes toward the elderly that were generated by 
the task itself, and which last beyond the end of the experiment.  It will be 
important for future research to determine whether priming tasks have the power 
to cause long-lasting changes in attitudes toward social stimuli. 
Experiments 3 and 4: Implications, Limitations and Future Directions 
 Experiments 3 and 4 clarified two important boundary conditions of the 
RM model.  Experiment 3 demonstrated that the response mapping process is 
dependent on the presence of clear, evaluative distinctiveness between the primes 
in the task.  That is, response mapping will be strong when the two classes of 
primes are evaluatively distinct (e.g. negative and positive, or negative and 
neutral), but will be weak or not occur at all when the two classes of primes are 
categorically distinct but evaluatively neutral (i.e. neutral color and neutral 
grayscale).  This represents a boundary condition to the RM model.  Specifically, 
one criterion for response mapping is that the primes must be evaluatively 
distinct.   
Experiment 4 demonstrated that even when the primes meet the evaluative 
distinctiveness criterion, the primes must also be categorically homogenous in 
order for response mapping to occur.  Even though the primes in that experiment 
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always represented two distinct evaluative categories (e.g. negative and neutral, or 
positive and neutral), participants nonetheless failed to map the primes when the 
semantic category boundaries were unclear.  This finding demonstrates that 
priming effects depend, in part, on a categorization process.  When participants 
cannot easily sort the primes into two distinct categories, then they cannot map 
the primes onto two distinct responses. 
Addressing some alternative explanations of Experiment 4  
One of the most surprising findings of the present research occurred in 
Experiment 4, which showed that even the most negative (e.g. skulls) and positive 
(e.g. ice cream) primes do not produce priming effects when the categorical 
boundaries between the primes are unclear.  This finding is surprising because it 
is somewhat rare to find circumstances under which these sorts of extreme stimuli 
do not produce priming effects.  Hence, before discussing the implications of 
these findings for the AMP, it is critical to examine some alternative explanations 
for this counterintuitive result. 
First, it is important to point out that the lack of significant priming in the 
case of the heterogeneous primes could not have been due to lack of strong 
attitudes toward these stimuli.  In fact, the heterogeneous prime stimuli were even 
more evaluatively extreme than the primes in the homogenous condition.  For 
example, the normed ratings of the heterogeneous negative primes (i.e. skulls, 
tornado, gun and crying boy) were more extremely negative than the ratings of the 
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homogeneous negative primes (i.e. snarling dog, snake, cockroach and shark).  
Moreover, the heterogeneous positive primes were more extremely positive than 
the homogeneous positive primes.   
Second, while it is technically possible that the lack of effects for the 
extreme primes could have been due to random sampling error, this possibility is 
also highly unlikely.  For one thing, AMP effects tend to be quite reliable.  This 
suggests that null effects in the AMP are probably quite reliable as well.   
Third, there could have been something about the heterogeneous primes 
themselves that resulted in null effects.  However, neither the heterogeneous 
positive nor heterogeneous negative primes produced any significant effects.  
From this perspective, it seems highly unlikely that some unknown variable, apart 
from prime heterogeneity, could have nullified the effects of both the positive and 
negative heterogeneous primes.  Hence, these three factors (lack of attitudes, lack 
of reliability, or third variable issues) cannot easily account for the surprising fact 
that extreme primes produced no priming when they belong to heterogeneous 
categories. 
Implications for the processes underlying the AMP 
The AMP is thought to have its effect through a process of attitude 
misattribution (Payne et al., 2005).  That is, on each trial the participant views the 
prime, has an evaluative reaction, and then misattributes that evaluative reaction 
to the Chinese character target.  According to this view, AMP effects should be 
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determined by participants’ feelings toward each individual prime, and not by 
their ability to perceive the categorical relationships among the primes.  Hence, a 
misattribution conceptualization of the AMP is difficult to reconcile with the 
present findings.  From the perspective of the current article, the AMP task might 
be better understood as a categorical misattribution procedure, insofar as 
participants misattribute the evaluative implications of the prime category to the 
targets. 
Although the RM model can account for the observed effects more easily 
than a misattribution model, more research is needed to substantiate these claims.  
For example, the RM model predicts that the heterogeneous primes will produce 
strong priming effects if participants are somehow able to categorize them (for 
example, if participants learn the categories prior to the priming task).  In future 
experiments, it might be instructive to encourage participants to think of the 
extreme stimuli as members of ad hoc categories (e.g. “terrible events”, or “things 
that make you feel good”).  Under these circumstances, one would expect the 
extreme stimuli to produce strong priming effects in spite of the fact that they do 
not belong, a priori, to a clear semantic category. 
Applications and Limitations of the Response Mapping Model 
There are a number of priming paradigms that can currently be used to assess 
implicit attitudes and associations.  These include lexical decision tasks (Neely, 
1991), the AMP (Payne et al., 2005), the IAT (Greenwald et al. 1998), evaluative 
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priming (Fazio et al. 1986), the Go/No-go task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), 
the affective Simon (De Houwer, 2003), weapon identification tasks (Correll, 
Park, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2002; Payne, 2001), and many others.  One important 
question is how far reaching the implications of the RM model actually are; that 
is, whether the model can explain a large portion, or only a small slice, of the 
existing implicit attitude and priming literature.  As it is currently understood, the 
RM model applies to any priming paradigm that fits the following criteria: 
1) Participants are asked to make categorical responses (e.g. “good” and 
“bad”, or “fruit” and “vegetable”). 
2) The prime stimuli consist of two or more categories that can be construed 
to correspond to the response labels being used in the relevant task.  For example, 
negative and neutral primes can be construed to correspond to negative and 
positive responses, by treating the neutral primes as “positive” in that particular 
task context. 
Importantly, the above criteria describe a large portion of priming research in 
social psychology, including most research involving the AMP, the IAT, 
evaluative priming, and other similar tasks, such as weapon paradigms (Fazio et 
al. 1986; Greenwald et al. 1998; Payne et al. 2005; Payne 2001).  In those tasks, 
participants are asked to categorize target stimuli using two response categories 
(criteria one). As for the primes, researchers usually select stimuli that are 
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extreme or highly categorizable (criteria two).  Under these conditions, the 
assumptions of the RM model should apply. 
A case in point is the classic experiment by Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & 
Williams (1995), on which much of the subsequent literature in this area is based.  
In those experiments, automatic reactions to black and white faces were 
measured.  On the critical trials, the primes were evenly divided between Black 
and White faces, and participants were asked to sort target words into “good” and 
“bad” categories.  Given these task parameters, it is easy to imagine how 
participants might have very easily applied the target categorization task to the 
primes, since both the primes and targets were evenly divided into two obvious 
categories.   
The RM model could also conceivably apply to the IAT, although no research 
has examined this issue.  In the IAT, the response mapping is, in fact, an explicit 
part of the experimental paradigm.  In fact, “response mapping” is often the exact 
phrase that is used to describe IAT effects.  For example, in Experiment 3 of 
Greenwald et al.’s classic article (1998), participants were asked to sort words 
according to two categorical dimensions: race (i.e. Black vs. White), and valence 
(i.e. pleasant vs. unpleasant).  Participants were faster when “Black” and 
“unpleasant” responses were made with the same key press, relative to when 
“Black” and “pleasant” responses were made with the same key press.  In this 
case, the responses to Black targets were literally mapped onto the “pleasant” or 
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“unpleasant” response, as a result of explicit task instructions.  Hence, there is 
reason to presume that the sorts of effects predicted by the RM model should hold 
true for the IAT. 
There are a number of instances in which the RM model will almost certainly 
not apply, however.  In those cases, other processes (such as spreading activation 
or response competition) can better explain observed priming effects.  For 
example, the RM model is not expected to apply in cases where the task judgment 
is independent from the effect of the primes, such as when the judgment is “word” 
vs. “non-word”, and the priming effect occurs only within the responses to real 
words (e.g. Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997).  In 
other priming paradigms, the dependent variable is an impression, rather than a 
target identification, and the RM model does not apply in these cases either (e.g. 
Devine, 1989).  Furthermore, the RM model is somewhat difficult to apply to 
paradigms such as the GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), and the affective Simon 
(De Houwer, 2003).  In sum, the processes described in the present article can be 
applied to many evaluative priming, AMP and IAT tasks, but are in no way 
capable of accounting for all implicit attitude effects.   
On the RM Model and the moderating effect of evaluative strength 
 There is one other potential limitation of the RM model that warrants 
additional comment.  The RM model may, at first blush, seem difficult to 
reconcile with some past research showing that priming effects are moderated by 
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evaluative strength.   For example, in Fazio et al.’s (1986) seminal experiments, 
the authors claimed to have found strong effects for the subset of primes that were 
known to have strong attitude associations, but weak effects for primes known to 
have weak attitude associations.  The RM model cannot explain these effects, 
because the model assumes that primes will be responded to categorically.  That 
is, the positive primes should be treated as being equal members of a “positive” 
category, regardless of how favorable any particular prime happens to be.   
Yet upon a closer look at Fazio et al.’s experiments, it turns out that the 
majority of the data in fact support the RM model.  In two out of three 
experiments, the weak primes did not show weak priming effects; instead, the 
weak primes showed no effects at all (moreover, when the weak primes finally 
did show priming, in Experiment 3, they did so only in one of the two SOA 
conditions).  That is, weak positive and weak negative primes generally showed 
priming effects that were not different from each other, and those effects were 
intermediate between the extreme primes.  In this sense, the weak primes 
exhibited effects that were exactly what one would expect from a set of control 
stimuli. 
The RM model can explain these effects by assuming that the strong 
primes were associated with a response, and the weak primes were not.  That is, 
participants categorized the primes as being positive, negative and neutral.  The 
negative primes were mapped onto the negative response, the positive primes 
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were mapped onto the positive response, and the rest of the primes were not 
mapped at all, because both of the available responses had already been “taken 
up” by the extreme primes.  One implication of this observation about Fazio et 
al.’s classic research is that it is not currently clear whether priming tasks can, in 
fact, show graded effects of evaluative strength beyond more than three levels 
(positive, negative, neutral) of primes.   
Directions for future research 
 The present experiments suggest numerous avenues for future research.  I 
have already mentioned that an additional experiment is needed to lend additional 
support to the conclusions of Experiment 4.  Furthermore, it might be instructive 
to employ the data analysis strategy from Experiment 3 to experiments that find 
null effects, especially those that involve social stimuli.  For example, social 
stimuli can be perceived in many different ways, depending on the context and 
who is doing the perceiving.  Some people may find elderly faces to be quite 
comforting, whereas others may find such faces ugly or negative.  If a researcher 
is interested in implicit attitudes towards the elderly, and finds null effects using a 
priming task, it could be that the participants are evenly distributed between liking 
for the elderly and dislike.  The analysis strategy employed here could potentially 
lend insight into such situations.   
 Finally, while the present experiments have demonstrated two boundary 
conditions to the RM model, there are almost certainly more.  Further research is 
 ci 
 
needed to discover what these boundary conditions are, and what the implications 
are for the interpretation of priming task results.  Such research will almost 
certainly lend further insight into the complex nature of priming tasks and 
automatic behaviors more generally. 
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Footnotes. 
 
1.  For example, a spreading activation account of these effects would have to 
assume that the accessibility of a cockroach’s “badness” is heightened when 
participants are making evaluative responses, whereas accessibility of a 
cockroach’s “noun-ness” is heightened when participants are making 
adjective/noun responses (Klauer & Musch, 2003). 
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Table 1. 
 
  Negative Context      Positive Context         Difference 
 
Valenced primes .36   .63   -.27*** 
 
Neutral primes .70   .53               .17*** 
 
 
Replication of contrast effect, Experiment 1.  Higher numbers indicate more 
pleasant responses.  Also note that in the Negative Context, valenced primes are 
threatening animals.  In the Positive Context, valenced primes are unthreatening 
(baby) animals.    
*** p < .001 
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Table 2. 
 
     Negative Context          Positive Context                Difference 
 
Valenced primes  .42   .62   -.20** 
 
Neutral primes  .68   .52               .16* 
 
 
Replication of contrast effect, Experiment 2.  Higher numbers indicate more 
pleasant responses.  Also note that in the Negative Context, valenced primes are 
threatening animals.  In the Positive Context, valenced primes are unthreatening 
(baby) animals.    
* p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Figure 1c. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3a 
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Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
 
No-switch condition:  Control prime
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Figure 6. 
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Figure 7. HOMOGENEOUS CATEGORY CONDITION        
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Figure 8. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
The Evaluative Priming Task 
 Researchers often vary the exact configuration of evaluative priming tasks, 
and so the following description is meant to be somewhat general (e.g. I will not 
specify exact presentation times, ISIs, masking procedures, etc. that were used in 
Scherer and Lambert’s research).  In the evaluative priming task, participants are 
presented with a series of rapid trials, each of which consists of a prime followed 
by a target.  The prime is often a picture, although it can also be a word (in the 
experiments that will be described, the prime is always a picture).  The target is 
always a positive or negative word, such as “wonderful” or “horrible”.  On each 
trial, the prime picture appears very briefly (approximately 100 milliseconds), and 
is immediately followed by the target word.  Participants are instructed to ignore 
the prime stimulus and respond only to the target word by indicating whether the 
target is positive or negative, using one of two appropriately labeled keyboard 
keys. 
 Even though participants are told to ignore the primes, these stimuli 
systematically bias participants’ responses to the targets.  For example, an 
evaluatively negative prime will make participants faster and more accurate in 
responding to negative targets.  In contrast, the negative prime will make 
participants slower and less accurate when responding to a subsequent positive 
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target.  As a result, the researcher can infer participants’ evaluations of the prime 
by observing how that prime influences participants’ responses to the targets.  
This task is considered indirect, or “implicit”, because attitudes towards the 
primes are assessed without ever asking participants how they feel about the 
prime stimuli directly.  Also, since participants are specifically instructed to 
ignore the primes, any influence of the prime on responses is usually assumed to 
be unintentional (assuming that participants are following instructions) and 
automatic (Fazio et al., 1995). 
In Scherer and Lambert’s experiments (2009), the primary dependent 
variable was participant accuracy rates, rather than reaction times.  Typically, 
accuracy data in evaluative priming are interpreted as follows:  Greater errors on 
positive than negative words following a particular prime indicate negative bias, 
whereas the reverse indicates positive bias.  The logic behind this interpretation is 
simple:  A negative prime will activate the negative response, making participants 
more prone to use this response when the word is actually positive.  Likewise, a 
positive prime will activate the positive response, with the end result being that 
participants will often use the positive response when the word is actually 
negative.   
One advantage of using errors as a dependent variable is that errors 
represent a lapse in cognitive control (Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001).  That is, 
participants are instructed to identify words accurately, and an error represents an 
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instance in which they fail to accomplish this task.  Hence, errors are thought to 
be independent—at least, more so than reaction times—of the sorts of controlled 
behaviors that participants might ordinarily exert when answering explicit 
questionnaires, such as self-monitoring and presentational biases (Fazio et al., 
1995).  Of course, it is important to keep in mind that errors are not a pure 
measure of participants’ automatized reactions to the prime; that is, tasks are not 
process pure (Jacoby, 1991).  Errors can also be caused by factors that are 
independent of the prime’s influence, such as arbitrary distractions, or task set 
expectations (for example, a participant may expect that the next trial will contain 
a negative word because the previous five trials were positive words).   
The Attitude Misattribution Paradigm Task 
 The AMP task (Payne et al., 2005) is similar in many ways to the 
evaluative priming task.  It consists of rapid trials in which a prime is followed by 
a target.  Participants are asked to ignore the prime and make binary 
positive/negative judgments to the targets.  However, unlike the evaluative 
priming task, in the AMP the target is always a Chinese character.  The 
participant’s task is to identify the characters as either more or less pleasant than 
average by pressing one of two appropriately labeled keys on a keyboard.   
Participants typically cannot read these characters (and those who can read 
the characters are removed from analyses), and the characters are presented 
extremely briefly (typically less than 100ms).  In addition, participants are told to 
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respond very quickly, based on their “gut” response to the target.  As a result, 
participants’ responses are not based on the objective attributes of the character 
itself.  Instead, participants tend to misattribute their evaluations of the primes as 
evaluations of the targets, because they have nothing else on which to base their 
judgments.  For example, a negative prime tends to increase the likelihood that 
the following target will be rated as “unpleasant”, whereas the reverse is true for 
positive primes.  One important assumption of the AMP is that this process occurs 
outside of participants’ conscious awareness.  That is, participants use the primes 
as a basis for judging the targets, but they are unaware that they are doing so. 
 One potential weakness of the AMP is that it is more susceptible than 
evaluative priming tasks to participants’ attempts to control their responses.  
Participants could easily choose to respond in a way that reflects the attitudes that 
they want to portray.  For example, if the primes included pictures Black and 
White faces, participants could attempt to diminish the appearance of racial bias 
by purposefully pressing the “pleasant” key following the Black faces.  However, 
experiments by Payne and colleagues (2005) suggest that participants are unable 
to control the influence of the primes on their responses.  For example, in one 
experiment, participants were warned that their responses might be influenced by 
the primes.  Moreover, they were told that under no circumstances should they let 
the primes influence their responses.  In spite of these directions, participants 
were still significantly influenced by the primes, in the expected direction.  
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Therefore, even when participants are given a strong incentive to follow 
directions and ignore the primes, they cannot.  These findings suggest that the 
results obtained in the AMP are usually the result of automatic evaluations of the 
primes, and not presentational biases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
